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* National Defense Program Examined

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[Article by military commentator Hirosato Asonuma: "Examining the 'National Defense Program Outline'"; passages in bold type as published]

[Mar 92 pp 43-51]

[Text] **Background of Japan's Defense Buildup**

After making a new start after World War II, Japan has carried on until today as a liberal nation with the basic concepts of freedom and democracy. In attaining the present state of economic development and prosperity out of the postwar devastation, a number of factors were involved.

Be that as it may, we should consider ourselves truly fortunate for having been able to enjoy peace for over 40 years after World War II. Although there were military conflicts on the periphery of the region, such as the Korean war and the Vietnam war, they could be viewed nonchalantly, after all, with a spectator's perspective. Not only that, but as seen in the cases of special procurements for Korea and Vietnam, they actually became positive factors, to a greater or lesser degree, in the recovery and improvement of Japan's economic power.

I mentioned that we were fortunate for having been able to enjoy peace and by that, I meant our government and the people were able to do that without having to give serious thoughts to or **needing to devise aggressive measures of our own to counter** military threats that might have been imposed from the outside against the maintenance of our national security and state economy.

There were reasons why we were able to get by, as we did, **without giving thought to matters that should have been considered seriously**. One of the reasons that can be cited is that we were under the occupation, for the first time, of the Allied powers after World War II and started to rebuild Japan while receiving protection.

We started to function as an independent nation after conclusion of the peace treaty, but as far as national security was concerned, we could not escape actually from the protective status. That aspect remains even today, after many years, as a part of the people's spiritual outlook.

It is an indisputable fact that the Japanese Constitution is one of the elements that influenced these developments. The article prescribing renunciation of war and nonpossession of war potential worked to great advantage in Japanese economic development. It can be said that, as far as the national security problem was concerned, dependence was placed on the United States as a continuation of the occupation days and as for self-defense buildup, the budget could be reduced with the Constitution as a shield.

After World War II, the people obtained many freedoms. Peace movements, with loud chants for peace, were no exceptions and evoked the people's sympathy, but it is not an exaggeration to say that they were generally based on emotional motivations, disavowing and abhorring wars, and not on reason. Fortunately, since World War II and up until the present, Japan has not been involved in military conflicts. In other words, we were at peace, but much of that was owed to the war-deterrent effect of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty which is a continuation of the occupation days. Of course, it cannot be denied that the nuclear deterrent power was effective as an underlying force.

Moreover, there should be a sensible recognition that **this peace did not result from preserving security and survival through "trust in the justice and faith of the people of other nations," as stated in the Preamble to the Japanese Constitution**.

Now, we should look back on how the Self-Defense Forces developed. Though no longer a part of our actual awareness at present, we must not forget the fact that security and peace were maintained in postwar Japan through the subrogated role played by the occupation forces. With the restoration of independence, the government should have established mechanisms to maintain security and peace as a completely independent nation but that did not happen. It is true that, by making Japan independent, interventions by other victorious nations were prevented, but, on the other hand, by making Japan renounce war and armament, Japan was forced to rely on the United States for defense. In fact, that was also the aim of the United States.

However, with the outbreak of the Korean war, it became necessary to commit the occupation forces and our government formed the National Police Reserve Force, a de facto military force, in compliance with occupation forces' orders. As everyone is aware, the National Security Force and the Maritime Guard Force were created in 1952, leading to the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces in 1954, and the budgets and personnel strengths gradually increased.

It can be said that the lofty ideals set forth in the Constitution crumbled easily in only a few years because of the necessity of realities. However, from that time, the painful history began for the Japanese Government to reconcile the Self-Defense Forces, a de facto military force, with the Constitution (particularly Article 9). It is also a harsh fact that the logic, which lies therein, has not been presented even to this day in a way that all the people can understand.

What kind of national security or defense policies, or peace strategies, would be most essential and desirable for our country should be decided primarily on the political stage, but careful consideration would show that, because the Japanese Constitution does not contain basic philosophies and concepts regarding defense—because there is a vacuum from the standpoint of national security—the constitutional problem has been the constant target of criticism and disputes in the history of the defense capability buildup, ever since the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces.

Progress of Defense Buildup—Developments Leading to Formulation of "National Defense Program Outline"

As noted earlier, to meet the demands of the occupation forces, the National Police Reserve Force was created and

the Maritime Guard Force emerged to augment the Maritime Safety Agency, and they became the Self-Defense Forces.

In fact, in his New Year's address of 1950, three years after the establishment of the Constitution, MacArthur reportedly stated that the Japanese Constitution does not deny self-defense rights and that statement can be viewed as the cornerstone of the establishment of the National Police Reserve Force. **The Japanese Government was forced to revive a de facto military force in accordance with the wishes of the supreme commander of the Allied powers.**

That can be interpreted as the root of the inconsistencies involving the Self-Defense Forces, which developed, like an offshoot organization, even before national security philosophies and concepts had been formed. It must be stated that confusion actually arose in the constitutional interpretations of the Self-Defense Forces because the occupation forces' supreme commander, who was above the Constitution, began to take a contradictory attitude and the confusion still continues. It can be said that, actually, even in the recent Gulf war, the encumbrance of this contradiction could not be evaded.

Detailed operations proceeded without a fundamental goal, and organizational expansions and budget increases were carried out, and, belatedly, defense objectives were clarified in the "Basic Policy for National Defense," adopted by the National Defense council and the Cabinet in May 1957.

The objective of national defense, stipulated in the "Basic Policy for National Defense," is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles, and the policy indicates clearly that the primary objective is to deter wars and conflicts.

To achieve this objective, the following basic principles were established:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.

2. To stabilize the people's livelihood and promote patriotism, thereby establishing the essential basis to guarantee national security.

3. To develop progressively effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.

4. To counteract external aggression on the basis of Japan-U.S. security arrangements until the United Nations can function effectively in the future to prevent such aggression.

To materialize the aforementioned national defense basic policy after FY58, three- or five-year period defense buildup plans were formulated to augment defense capabilities.

With the termination of the fourth-phase defense buildup program in 1976, the "National Defense Program Outline," based on new concepts, was approved by the National Defense Council and the cabinet.

The general feeling at the time was that Japan's defense conformed to the basic national defense policy, but there was criticism that the policy only prescribed so-called abstract concepts and was not explicit about the extent of defense capability that should be possessed.

Therefore, under the leadership of the then Defense Agency director general, Michita Sakata (Administrative Vice Minister Takuya Kubo), the Defense Agency organized the "Forum on Defense Issues," in which scholars and intellectuals were the main participants, and discussions were held on concepts and objectives which should constitute the basis of defense buildups, policies for defense programs, etc. On the basis of that study, the framework of the defense program outline was established.

The "National Defense Program Outline" responded to the above criticisms, by indicating the level of defense capability to be maintained in peacetime and also, specifying the guideline for advancing defense buildups.

Since FY77, the defense buildup was carried out in accordance with the "National Defense Program Outline." Its course is as indicated in the above chart [not reproduced].

Summary of "National Defense Program Outline"

Following the developments described earlier, the "National Defense Program Outline" became official and was recognized publicly, and a review of the assessment of the international situation ("Estimate of the Situation") on which the program was premised reveals the following:

1. Due to the military balance, including mutual nuclear deterrence, and various efforts being made to stabilize international relations, the possibility is slight that a full-scale military clash between the East and the West or a major armed conflict leading to such a clash would occur.

2. While the possibility of limited military conflicts breaking out near Japan cannot be dismissed, the equilibrium status between the superpowers and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements should continue to play a major role in maintaining international stability and in preventing full-scale aggression against Japan.

This basic assessment can be evaluated as having been generally correct even after viewing the subsequent changes in Japan's neighboring conditions.

With such an assessment of the international situation as the premise, the "National Defense Program Outline" prescribes defense concepts. The essence is as follows: that is, the basic defense concept, in a normally stabilized situation, is for Japan to possess an adequate defense capability of its own and to develop a defense posture capable of dealing with any aggression that might arise, within the framework of Japan-U.S. security arrangements, and thereby display the power to deter wars.

Also, the concept prescribes that if deterrence fails, aggression would be repelled at the earliest date with the cooperation of the United States in order to restore peace.

On the basis of this thinking, the "Outline" sets the defense level ("i.e., the peacetime strength") that Japan should possess and defines the so-called "basic defense" concept:

1. Provide for various functions required for defense and **maintain a balanced posture in organization and deployment**, including the logistical support area.

2. **Maintain a full surveillance posture in peacetime.**

3. Possess the capability to cope with situations up to limited and small-scale invasions.

4. Maintain a basic setup that would allow for smooth transition to a new defense posture if so required by serious changes in the situation.

According to the Defense Agency's explanation, the **basic defense strength** concept, which is based on the aforementioned international situation assessment, clearly indicates the determination that, against any unlawful infringement on national peace and state sovereignty, the Self-Defense Forces will resist, first, with its capabilities and thereby, aim to contribute to the deterrence of wars.

Also, in the defense capability buildup, to keep up with trends of different countries' technological levels, the basic policy is to seek and maintain qualitative augmentation and upgrading and, when implementing plans, to consider the economic and fiscal conditions existing at the time and to execute in harmony with the nation's various other measures.

"Scale of Defense Capability That Should Be Possessed" as Stated in National Defense Program Outline

As for the concrete scale of the defense capability that should be maintained, following this fundamental line of thinking, the basic units and main equipment of each Self-Defense Force, based on the armed strength possessed in 1976, are shown in the "Organization of Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces" and "appended chart to the National Defense Program Outline," and the framework is clearly outlined. These basic defense capabilities are described as follows:

Ground Self-Defense Force

To be able to conduct systematic defense operations speedily and effectively from the beginning of aggression in any part of Japan, divisions, etc., will be maintained in a balanced deployment, taking into account Japan's geographical features.

Maritime Self-Defense Force

As the mobile operating ship unit which can respond quickly to emergency situations, such as aggression at sea, a fleet escort force capable of maintaining, at least, one escort flotilla on alert "at all times" will be possessed.

Air Self-Defense Force

To provide the capability of maintaining "continuous" alert to take immediate and appropriate actions against violations of Japan's territorial airspace and air incursions, fighter units will be possessed.

In order to be able to carry out these missions, in one way or another, the units and equipment that each force should possess are shown in the so-called "appended chart to the National Defense Program Outline." The chart shows the quantitative scale of the basic defense capabilities.

As for the qualitative aspect, the "Outline" states that consideration should be given to maintaining parity with the technical standards of other nations and also stipulates that attention should be given to such points as providing for adequate personnel measures, maintaining and improving defense facilities, considering domestic production of armament, strenghtening the technological R&D setup, etc.

Concerning the Problem of "1 Percent of GNP" Ceiling on Defense Costs

The "National Defense Program Outline" was adopted in FY76 and, as mentioned earlier, it was the response to criticism about the extent to which defense power might grow. During that process, a certain ceiling was placed on defense-related budgets to acknowledge the public reaction.

In deliberations at the aforementioned "Forum on Defense Issues," this problem was studied and it was determined that the size of the defense budget until then had generally been about 1 percent of the GNP. Thereupon, it was decided to use this figure to set a ceiling financially, in addition to establishing quantitative limits on defense capabilities, in order to appeal to public opinion.

That conclusion led to the guideline approved by the National Defense Council and the cabinet on 5 November 1976.

That guideline stipulated that, "in the defense buildup, 'for the present,' the program will be carried out with the intent that the total sum of defense-related expenditures for each fiscal year should not exceed the sum equivalent to one-hundredth of the GNP for that corresponding year," and since then, that had even been considered inviolate, politically and socially.

The words, "for the present," were used then and actually, judging by the economic growth taking place at the time, it was believed that the goals of the defense buildup could be accomplished in three or four years. Together with the "National Defense Program Outline," this cabinet decision has functioned since then as a financial restraint on the defense buildup. The "National Defense Program Outline" set the scale of defense power that should be possessed in peacetime and the government has undertaken defense buildup since then with the above financial limitation in mind.

However, in formulating the FY87 budget, defense-related costs were expected to exceed the 1-percent GNP ceiling and based on the decision of the Security Council of Japan

and the cabinet on 30 December 1986, the 1-percent ceiling is, in fact, no longer considered applicable.

Concerning the New Mid-Term Defense Plan

Tracing the course of developments of the defense buildup programs, it can be seen that since 1977, the program had been carried out without adopting a government-level midterm plan and budget requests for each fiscal year had been based on the Defense Agency's internal reference document, "Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate." However, from the standpoint of ensuring civilian control, the five-year plan beginning FY86 reverted to a government plan and the Mid-Term Defense Program again became a program subject to approval by the National Defense Council and the cabinet.

Since the effective period of this program was to end in FY90, the government released the announcement, "Concerning the Basic Concept of the Defense Program after FY91," with the approval of the Security Council of Japan and the cabinet on 19 December 1990, and on the following day, 20 December, the Security Council and the cabinet adopted the new Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program (FY91 to FY95). This is the "new mid-term program," in short.

The ideological reasoning used in devising this program was that **though there are changes in the international situation, the basic concept in the "National Defense Program Outline" will be adhered to in the future.**

The situational assessment was made that the severe conditions of East-West confrontation seen at the time the "National Defense Program Outline" was formulated are disappearing, but unstable factors, such as regional conflicts created by religious confrontations or ethnic problems, territorial disputes, nationalism, etc., still exist, as heretofore, so in the defense buildup, the appropriate option was still considered to be the continued adherence to the "basic defense concept," which is the fundamental thought in the "National Defense Program Outline."

In implementing the new mid-term program, the government calculated that the defense level envisaged in the "National Defense Program Outline" can be attained generally and aims to carry out an even more effective defense buildup.

In the 1991 edition of the *Defense of Japan* (Defense White Paper), the special features of the new mid-term program are explained as follows:

1. In the overall defense capability, maintain and augment an effective and balanced setup.

a. Replacement and modernization of the main equipment will be a standard function.

b. Plan further improvements in the so-called logistics area, including the living environment of personnel; various support functions such as intelligence, command, and communications; technological R&D, etc.

2. Coping With "Personnel" Problem

In view of the fact that the recruitment environment of defense personnel will become increasingly severe in the future, the following steps will be taken to cope with the "personnel" problem of the Self-Defense Forces:

a. Efforts will be made to further increase efficiency and rationalization in the buildup and operational aspects of the defense program.

b. The appropriate level of defense capability, including the authorized number of self-defense personnel, will be considered, and a conclusion will be reached during this program.

c. In the augmentation of Ground Self-Defense Force personnel, an upper limit will be set after considering the current situation. New requirements for personnel in the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces will be met through measures aimed at increased efficiency and rationalization.

3. Maintenance and Enhancement of the Credibility of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The maintenance and enhancement of the credibility of Japan-U.S. security arrangements are extremely important to ensure Japan's security. Therefore, various measures will be promoted, such as providing support for the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan.

4. Specifying Ceiling on Total Sum of Expenditures

The ceiling on expenses required to carry out this program is specified in a monetary amount (in real terms), based on prices in FY90 when the program was drawn up, and the method was adopted to set defense-related expenditures for each fiscal year during the effective period, within the limit of the total sum. (passage omitted)

This method will show the particulars of the defense buildup and the supporting expenditures in a consolidated form so it should serve as a concrete and rational guideline in the defense program.

5. Ensuring Flexibility in Program

In carrying out the new mid-term defense program, after three years have passed, the various foreign and domestic conditions prevailing at the time will be reviewed and the program will be revised, as necessary, within the aforementioned total sum limitation.

Thus, the new mid-term defense program is flexible in dealing with situational changes and, if the program must be revised, it can be changed accordingly.

Situation When Goal of "National Defense Program Outline" Is Achieved

Through the new mid-term program, the quantitative scale of the defense capability aimed at by the "National Defense Program Outline" will be generally achieved. That situation is shown in the table on the previous page [table not translated].

Also, it was decided that the ceiling on the total sum of defense-related expenditures over the five-year period of

the new mid-term program will be set at approximately 22.75 trillion yen, based on FY90 prices.

[Apr 92 pp 66-76]

[Text] **Assessment and Future Expectations of "Defense Buildup Program Outline"**

1. It can be said that through the formulation of the "Defense Buildup Program Outline," the **concept and philosophy of defense buildup in peacetime** were established. The common interpretation is, first of all, to provide for various types of functions required in defense and to maintain a balanced posture in organization and deployment for both frontline and rear sectors. In addition, the point to note is **to sustain the capability to maintain a full surveillance posture in peacetime**. Expectation is being placed on the effect these steps will have in serving as measures to deter wars.

The extent of defense capability to be maintained is determined as the level that, in the event of invasion, can counter effectively limited and small-scale aggression; however, should invasion of a much larger scale occur, the commitment of U.S. military power, through activation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, is being counted upon.

Well, a balanced organization and deployment of frontline and rear elements are being professed as the objectives, but will they materialize through the defense buildup based on the "Defense Buildup Program Outline" and the new midterm program predicated on the outline?

On looking back, it can be said that in the process of building up the defense capability since the formation of the Self-Defense Forces [SDF], to sum up, the quantitative aspect of frontline equipment has been considered the uppermost task. It is not an exaggeration to say that the successive SDF leaders' sense of mission was absorbed in that task. It is also certain that, conversely, the mentality existed that if the front line is readied, the augmentation of the logistics area will follow automatically.

Influenced by such a guideline, frontline strength had to be given priority in the budget preparation. On the other hand, fiscal authorities always set the criterion that "there won't be any drastic increase in the budget." To apply such a yardstick to total defense-related expenditures might be appropriate during the so-called peacetime and is fully understandable but as the years passed, the "no drastic increase" stipulation prohibited any significant reform in all of the budget categories (covering articles, items, subitems and paragraphs).

This explains why the SDF has existed until today without any drastic reforms in its structure since it was formed.

Of course, quality upgrading was not ignored in past defense buildups. It is true that efforts have been made to modernize weapons and equipment and acquire high-performance aircraft and ships. However, **emphasis** had been given persistently to items regarded as frontline equipment and, regrettably, the fact is that planning and actions have not been extended to the makeup of defense power.

Besides, the adoption of the policy to limit our country's defense outlay to 1 percent of the GNP made significant reforms of the structure—to cover up deficiencies—almost hopeless.

Table 1. Breakdown of Expenditures

(Units: 1 million yen, %)

Classification	Previous Mid-Term Program (1986-90)	(Share)	New Mid-Term Program (1991-95)	(Share)	Increase (Share)
Frontline	47,500 (25.8)	9.3	51,000 (22.4)	2.1	3,500 (8.0)
Of which, new	29,900	—	30,200	—	300 (0.7)
Logistics	60,500 (32.9)	6.4	91,500 (40.2)	5.9	31,000 (71.3)
Personnel, provisions	76,000 (41.3)	2.4	85,000 (37.4)	0.6	9,000 (20.7)
Defense-related expenses	184,000 (100.0)	5.4	227,500 (100.0)	3.0	43,500 (100.0)

Notes:
1. Monetary sums were calculated on the basis of FY85 prices for the previous mid-term program and FY90 prices for the new program.
2. Simple comparisons cannot be made with the increments which were shown as references to enable grasp of the general trend.
3. Figures in the right-hand column under previous and new mid-term programs denote the annual average real growth rate by type of expenditure.

2. On the Problem of Defense Power Structure

I need not take the trouble to refute the fact that the defense power structure that should be established is spelled out in the defense concept prescribed in the "Defense Buildup Program Outline" and its extension, the new mid-term program. Following up on the previous mid-term program, the posture aimed at further augmenting the logistics area, such as various support functions including intelligence, command, and communications, can be readily seen. That tendency can be deduced from the budget framework.

However, there are many doubts as to whether the present structure of defense power is as balanced and effective a setup as prescribed in the "Defense Buildup Program Outline."

As examples, let us consider intelligence, command, and communications. Certainly, the priority allocation of funds to the logistics area, including various support functions such as intelligence, command, and communications, can be evaluated positively but, as mentioned earlier, because frontline equipment was given precedence from the time of SDF formation and, faced with the environment in which frontline equipment expenditures keep increasing, deficiencies which existed before still continue to exist and that situation has not been dealt with successfully even to this day.

To put it plainly, intelligence and communications have been handled, more or less, as auxiliary functions in the defense buildup, but their importance is extremely great, equaling that of frontline strength. **It is not an exaggeration to say that if intelligence and communications capabilities are inferior, no matter how excellent the frontline equipment possessed, the services that such equipment can render will be nullified.**

To further upgrade these capabilities in the future, measures based on new concepts are desirable. First of all, I believe that it is necessary to conduct an appropriate system analysis.

Excuse me for bringing up a somewhat outdated item, but the 1965 edition of the periodical, NAVAL REVIEW, carried it. I want to present the following item which was contained in the introduction to the treatise, "System Analysis and the Navy," by the then assistant defense secretary, Alan Enthoven:

"If the Navy is to continue to make a vital contribution to U.S. security, it must keep rethinking its purpose, redefining its missions, and reshaping its forces."

Let's suppose that the words were changed from "Navy" to "SDF" and "U.S. security" to "Japanese security" and the term, "forces" were replaced with "SDF structure."

If the "Defense Buildup Program Outline" is going to be reassessed, it will certainly become necessary, as stated in the foregoing quotation, to rethink the purpose of the SDF, redefine its missions, and reshape its structure and, to do that, a system analysis will be needed.

3. Coping With Changes in International Environment

The "Basic Policy for National Defense," which was adopted in May 1957, can be evaluated as being highly pertinent in expressing the concept and philosophy of Japan's country's national security.

The following statement appears at the very beginning: "Support the activities of the United Nations, promote international cooperation, and thereby contribute to the realization of world peace."

In the political declaration of the advanced countries' summit held in July 1991 in London, the phrase, "strengthen peacekeeping functions of the UN" is incorporated and this might be taken as the expression of a new security concept for world peace and order following the cold war.

During the entire period when the situation escalated from the Gulf crisis to the Gulf war, did Japan adopt a truly independent response to this problem? The answer is clearly "no."

Prior to the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in 1981, former Prime Minister Suzuki spoke at a gathering of the Japan-U.S. Society in New York, and I want to recollect the following statement that he made in his speech:

"For Japan, which built its present position while relying heavily on world peace and order, contributing to their maintenance and development is an obligatory duty. In the international society with increasing difficulties, we aim to reverse the passive attitude of the past and build a country that will fulfill its international obligations on its own initiative in order to strengthen and foster world peace. **From a passive benefactor to an active creator in international society... in other words, this is the 'third start,' for our country.** Together with our country's 'third start,' I place great expectations on the creation of new peace and order on this earth."

Although the leader of a country proclaimed loudly, as mentioned, that he aims to build a country that will fulfill its international obligations on its own initiative, it is really regrettable that the former state of affairs has not changed during the past 10 years.

However, **it might be said that the dispatch of minesweepers after the Gulf war was the precursor action to this third start.**

How to aggressively cope with and dispose of such problems as cooperation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) and participation in peacekeeping forces (PKF) will become important tasks hereafter.

I hope that sincere policy discussions will be held, without falling uselessly into disputes about internal legal interpretations, and that our country will become a worthy active creator to exert efforts that can be evaluated internationally.

4. Credibility of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty worked effectively to maintain our country's peace and security. Moreover, the security arrangements based on this treaty **are esential conditions that cannot be ignored, to say the least, in maintaining peace and security in Asia.**

In view of our country's geo-economic and geo-military positions, the fact that we should face squarely is that Japan is not an autarchic archipelago.

In World War II, Japan broke the geopolitical taboo that maritime nations must not fight each other. Regretfully, we must learn from the history lesson that we fought with a country that we shouldn't have antagonized.

Thinking carefuily, it can be seen that science and technology are advancing steadily on the basis of lessons learned from history but human beings make mistakes repeatedly because they do not learn from: historical teachings.

Our country's leaders should view Japan-U.S. security arrangements in light of the above context and we should never damage the credibility of the arrangements through our own actions.

The defense concept in the "Defense Buildup Program Outline" can be realized only within the framework of Japan-U.S. security arrangements.

5. "Personnel" Problem

Attention is focused again on the "personnel" problem in the new mid-term program. This might not simply be a SDF problem, but, from the standpoint of the SDF, which is entrusted by the people with the nation's security and peace, it is a very serious problem.

To cope with this problem, three courses have been presented in the new mid-term defense program, as mentioned previously. Concerning efforts to increase efficiency and rationaliztion, which was listed as the first step, it cannot be refuted that the time has arrived to seriously consider reshaping the defense power structure.

Throughout the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, it might be become necessary to undertake reforms aimed at creating a structure that might termed as technology- and capital-intensive defense power. In addition, efforts should be directed toward a defense capability that emphasizes use of software.

It is hoped that priority will be placed on information and communications skills, as stated previously, and that **decisive** fund outlays will be made for them.

Summary

This article focused the presentation on the limited subject of verifying the "Defense Buildup Program Outline" but actually, I think it is necessary to revert to rethinking and redefining along the lines laid out in the "Basic Policy for National Defense," which is the concept with a higher precedence. Furthermore, I think that unless the overall national security posture is analyzed, including verification of the national crisis management system as well as civilian control, the heart of the problem will not be touched upon when reassessing the "Defense Buildup Program Outline." Needless to say, the constitutional problem is another big issue that has to be debated from now on.

The Japanese Constitution must not become a religious symbol like the Meiji Constitution. Though the simile might not be appropriate, just as metal fatigue in aircraft frequently triggers big accidents, there is talk on the streets that fatigue resulting from repeated constitutional interpretations might lead to a big mishap jeopardizing national survival—an observation that should be taken into consideration.

The concept of basic defense buildup, which was advocated in the "Defense Buildup Program Outline," was the target of various criticisms as soon as the program was announced. The objective was really the establishment of a "Standing Operation Force" but some believed at first that what was meant was the "defense foundation" as known until then, that is, the national support structure to maintain defense capability, such as defense industry capacity, support functions of various government organs, etc. I also recall that there was concern as to whether the level advocated was adequate. Now, faced with the post-cold war situation, the ideal state of defense capability in peacetime will be reconsidered, which should give the concept a new vitality, but it must also be given a new breath of life.

However, when a new defense posture is considered necessary because of significant changes in the situation, as to whether a smooth transition can be made in the defense capability, as prescribed in the "Defense Buildup Program Outline," there is no stipulation anywhere on **how the government will guarantee that** so it is a matter of great concern which should be clarified in the future.

Unless that is done, the basic defense capability might turn out to be really useless.

Supplemental Explanatory Materials—No. 1

On War Deterrent

A realistic and solid peace which actually exists (and a peace which will probably benefit us in the foreseeable future) also means peace that is supported (might be supported), though perhaps not desirably, by the logic of nuclear deterrence of wars.

Japan's basic policy for national defense states, "prevent direct and indirect aggressions...." This statement can be said to express, in other words, the concept of deterring wars.

Before we proceed further, we must have an accurate understanding of what deterrence means. The concept of deterrence is not peculiar to nuclear weapons. Generally speaking, the primary objective of military strength and armament or military preparedness is to prevent conflicts and wars.

However, since the advent of nuclear weapons following World War II, the concept of deterrence has occupied a unique position. Therefore, the conditions which enable deterrence to work effectively must be considered and the following can be mentioned:

1. The national leaders' determination to impose punishments resolutely, in cases of unlawful aggressions or violations, must be made apparent. Moreover, the people must support the leaders' resolution and have the will to fight unlawful aggressions.

2. Possess real capability. If military power has to be exercised, the capability to defeat the enemy must be possessed. If the strength of one country is inadequate, the combined strength of alliances should be considered.

3. Possess sufficient military power. In effect, sufficiency becomes the important element. Great importance is attached to military power balance because of this viewpoint.

4. As an extremely important condition in present-day deterrent power, the strategic deployment of troops can be mentioned.

The above can be said to be conditions which merit attention in the makeup of deterrent power in the nuclear and missile age.

Deterrence provided by nuclear weapons can be said, in brief, to rest on a balance of fears, but it is dependent not only this fear but conversely, on trust in human rationality that nuclear wars will not occur.

Looking ahead to future changes in our environment, from peace to nuclear wars, we should prepare a **spectrum of conflicts**, and constantly think about countermeasures, covering politics, economics, diplomacy and military, to cope with each eventuality.

Supplemental Explanatory Materials—No. 2

On Three Nonnuclear Principles—Consider Relations With Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

To put an end to the postwar occupation status, our country grappled with the problem of Okinawa reversion. In the process of realizing that, the then Prime Minister Sato engaged in Japan-U.S.ese negotiations with "without nuclear weapons; same as homeland" as the main proposition. Following were the "four pillars of our country's nuclear policy" on which the negotiations were centered:

1) Adhere to the three nonnuclear principles. 2) Maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. 3) Promote nuclear arms reduction. 4) Promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The main points in the thinking regarding these nuclear measures are described below.

Our country is building up a defense capability befitting our national strength under the three nonnuclear principles, but, first, we must realize the harsh fact that **we are relying on U.S. nuclear deterrent power to counter the international nuclear threat** and, moreover, with regard to the total elimination of nuclear weapons prayed for by the Japanese people and the peaceful uses of atomic energy to open up the future for mankind, we must strive to exert the influencing power stemming from the Japanese people's wisdom.

The legal interpretation of the Constitution that nuclear arms is permissible within the scope of self-defense rights is valid, in the government's view, but **the three nonnuclear principles were set forth as principles based on a government policy**.

As options based on a policy decision, the principles should be respected accordingly but the point that must be noted is that they do not exist separately as taboos which must not be violated and have significance only in combination with the other three measures, particularly the second on maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In other words, they become significant only when related to dependence on U.S. nuclear deterrent power.

In the Defense White Paper, the expression is used that "our country is adhering to the three nonnuclear principles as a national policy" but of course, it is literally a political policy. However, as long as they are principles, the following point should not be forgotten.

That is, there is the maxim, **principles should be applied when applicable and should not be applied when the application is not feasible**.

As a basic national policy, our country concluded the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and made it the pillar of security measures but it means that as a nonnuclear power existing in the nuclear age, our country is totally dependent as far as nuclear strategy is concerned.

It is necessary for our country to place a high reliance on the war deterrent power of nuclear arms. **That is not only our right but our responsibility.**

Supplemental Explanatory Materials—No. 3

Civilian Control—Particularly on Aggressive (Active) Civilian Control

"Aggressive (active) civilian control" should mean the type of control where the people, who are the sovereigns, insist that politics be responsible by posing questions, such as "with only the actions being taken, can the country really be defended?," while politics conduct investigations seriously as to whether the defense capability can function adequately in accordance with its missions and objectives, make recommendations aggressively as needed to spur the government to action and thereby, respond to the trust of the people.

The activities of the U.S. Congress can be mentioned as a notable example in making this type of aggressive (active) civilian control function. In every incident where the delay in transmitting intelligence or the delay in issuing command became a problem, such as the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo by North Korea, the shooting down of the EC-121 aircraft or the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea during the Arab-Israel war, the U.S. Congress took up the problem, established special committees to conduct thorough investigations and "admonished" the military aggressively. As a result, drastic reforms in the U.S. C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence) system were devised. It was reported that funds allocated to the U.S. C3I system equaled the budget for strategic strength and this came about because the aforementioned aggressive civilian control exercised by Congress was effective.

In contrast, the nature of the civilian control advocated in our country, at present, might be termed negative (passive) civilian control or even called restrictive-type civilian control.

As a reference item, the government's reply (14 Oct 80) to the interpellation by Lower House member, Yanosuke Narasaki, regarding the civilian control principle is given below:

"We believe that in a democratic nation, the precedence of politics over military must be guaranteed.

"Under our country's present system, the Constitution stipulates that the prime minister and state ministers, who are the highest leaders responsible for the administration of government, including state affairs related to national defense, must all be civilians; also, important matters related to defense must pass through the National Defense Council; furthermore, laws, budgets, etc. affecting the SDF, which is the national defense organization, are placed under the democratic control of the Diet; therefore, we believe that the principle of civilian control is being carried out fully.

"Thus, the government is exercising strict control over the SDF under the present system and plans to continue devoting careful attention to this point in the future."

Supplemental Explanatory Materials—No. 4

On Crisis Management—What Crisis Management Means

The word "crisis" in "crisis management" is basically a medical term and is said to mean a sudden change—in normal cases, worsening—that could be the turning point to determine whether the patient is nearing death.

As for the word "management," it is said to refer, in medical language, to the overall system used in treating patients. In other words, "crisis management" refers basically to the overall system for treating patients to promote recovery from illnesses while preventing deterioration that could become life-or-death conditions.

Applying this traditional definition to the security (military) area in international relations, when conflicts between two nations or among several nations turn suddenly into a situation that could be the watershed between the course to war or the course to restoring peace, the overall ystem used by the disputing countries to prevent the crisis, which is the sudden change in the state of conflicts, from escalating into war and to de-escalate the crisis to permit settlement of the conflicts can be called crisis management or the crisis management system.

Essentially, the concept called crisis management was built on the basis of a U.S.-UK study centered on the question of how to cope with international crises, that is, when the territory and people or the sovereignty and vital interests of a country are threatened by another country and the situation worsens suddenly to a point where actual violations might be committed. This study was conducted with the view that it was different from the study on administrative measures to cope with crises in domestic societies, such as economic and social unrest or big disasters such as earthquakes or terrible accidents.

Crisis management is aimed at the means to control crises in the international society and basically, it is treated as a security matter concerned with the problem of whether armed conflict might occur with other countries.

As to what constitutes international countermeasures in crisis management, in general terms, they are a series of actions to deter (prevent beforehand) the occurrence of crises in peacetime, to settle the issue by taking speedy counteractions in case crises develop and to prevent their reoccurrence.

The concept includes even planning to counteract effectively and devise settlements in case the situation worsens and war breaks out. Needless to say, both non-military measures, such as diplomacy, and military actions are contemplated.

On Our Country's Handling of Crisis Management

Recently, in our country too, awareness of the problem that a crisis management setup must be organized has grown. Such views were expressed during the past incident when a MiG-25 made a forced landing in Hakodate and shocked terribly by the incident in which a Korean Airlines aircraft was shot down, the movement has strengthened to seek countermeasures.

In both cases, the inadequacy, as a nation, of an intelligence system and a communications system for command and control was felt strongly and complaints are increasing that such systems should be established.

In other words, it might be said that the necessity to establish a national (governmental) decisionmaking system has been recognized.

Crisis management was mentioned earlier as a concept created basically from the security standpoint but pollution and environmental destruction problems are beginning to be spotlighted throughout the world while disasters caused by large-scale earthquakes as well as various dangerous activities, such as international terrorist actions, riots, etc., can no longer be ignored and these events which can jeopardize the stability of the people's livelihood and the national economy are drawing the attention of the people and demanding the counteraction of the government. Although these are nonmilitary crises, the speed and skill needed in handling them have become just as urgent and serious a problem for the people.

Influenced by such a domestic atmosphere, our country also started a study of the crisis management system during the Nakasone cabinet's regime. However, a restriction was placed on the study. The restriction was that consideration must not be given to the question of how to cope with such crises as wars. It was then that a state minister was exclusively appointed to handle crisis management but, reportedly, the minister realized, as the study progressed, that the heart of the problem will not be delved into unless national security was considered and spent his own money to extend the research to security matters. This situation can be interpreted to mean that a "philosophy of fear" clearly prevailed in the then government.

Our country's bureaucracy can certainly be evaluated as being superior but the fact cannot be ignored that there is a defect, concealed behind the excellence, because it is a vertical administration. A situation like the following can develop: Taking the example of a patient, with the modernization of the medical treatment system, the links

between specialized fields have become difficult to synthesize and faced with a patient in critical condition, treatment might be delayed if the physicians in charge of different fields take the attitude that "it is not my business." As one of the measures to strengthen the cabinet's functional capacity, a national security office was established but in the future, steps must absolutely be taken to appoint a secretariat councillor, exclusively responsible for national security, in each of the ministries and agencies so that constant liaison can be maintained with that security office.

In considerations of the crisis management system, I want to propose that the "textile logic" be given serious thought—the textile is not good unless the warp and the woof are of equal strength. The warp naturally symbolizes the vertical administration system. The woof might be thought of as the horizontal staff functions. The nature of the nation's security function will become clearer, without further explanations, if it is likened to a piece of textile.

On Risks

To handle national crises, macro-scale decisions and management are needed. However, "macro" is not necessarily the sum of "micro." When faced with crises, leaders have to decide and select what sacrifices to make. In that sense, leaders have to shoulder grave risks.

No matter what their positions, so-called leaders are always saddled with risks. Leaders must base their thinking on risks and make judgments according to risks. In the handling of risks, they must try to reduce, as much as possible, **unknown risks**. Also, they must strive constantly to change, as best as they can, **unknown risks** to **known risks**. This risk control can be mentioned as one of the essential points in crisis management. First and foremost, that is dependent on intelligence capability.

Supplemental Explanatory Materials—No. 5

On Defense Capability and Intelligence

It is true that intelligence is not considered a principal part of the defense capability. However, without intelligence, sound judgments and proper execution of defense power are not possible. Sherman Kent said that intelligence was "knowledge," that it was "operations," and that it was "organization," but it seems that our country does not have a definite concept, in its defense buildup plans, on how much capital (personnel, materiel and funds) should be allocated to it.

Intelligence is not the same as information or data; news, rumors or hearsay; or a simple fact. It is the product resulting from the analyses of such items and collation with other materials, data and facts. It might be called a "fact" that was made meaningful. On that score, it has something in common with history.

Intelligence is said to be a **marginal skill**, like differentials, and it can be called an activity that tries endlessly to close the gap between fact and truth.

When classifyin , intelligence related to defense, various divisions are possible, such as strategic, operational, tactical, technical, etc.

In the process of building up defense, it was possible to upgrade tactical intelligence capability relatively smoothly together with the buildup of frontline equipment. That was because it was recognized as an indispensable element in the tactical operations of frontline equipment. Especially with the progress in electronics technology, modernization was carried out diligently.

The problem lies in the strategic intelligence field. When our country's intelligence capability is viewed, not only from the defense aspect but from the standpoint of national security, it must be said that the organization, operations and, in turn, the intelligence developed by them are noticeably inferior to other advanced countries.

With the advancement of the mass media, it is possible to obtain facts in abundance but the capability to develop intelligence from them is unreliable. Moreover, as for the acquisition process, the system to collect information independently can be called poor. If the intelligence capability is inferior, it will eventually hinder the formulation of independent judgments in the decision-making process. That means that truly independent actions cannot be taken. There is a glaring difference between Japanese and U.S. intelligence capabilities. It is only reasonable to assume that the wider the intelligence gap, the more difficult it is to maintain independence. Also, intelligence gaps inevitably create perception gaps. In other words, one must be prepared that perception gaps will be produced. The impact of perception gaps is extremely significant.

* Reassessment of Defense Program Outline Urged

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[Article by Kazuo Tomiyama: "The New Disarmament Era and Japan's Defense—Radically Rethinking the Failed 'National Defense Program Outline'"]

[Text] **1. Trend Toward Full-Scale Disarmament**

Rapid changes have been accomplished in the world political situation in the last few years. It may be safe to say that the recent East-West cold war structure, pivoting on the "balance of fear," has now basically disappeared. The Warsaw Pact organization was disbanded, and the former Soviet Union has transformed into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), losing the past status as a military superpower. In what form the former Soviet Union will obtain its stability for the present and what will become of its military power? There are still many opaque facets as to these questions. Nevertheless, it is certain that the whole world has begun taking assured steps toward disarmament due to the termination of the cold war.

In his State of the Union message on 28 January, U.S. President Bush disclosed a series of disarmament policies such as a $50 billion cut in defense spending in five years, a total halt to the production of nuclear weapons including

nuclear warheads, and a cessation of strategic nuclear missile production. The United States has thus far continued huge military spending despite its colossal budget deficits. In the latter half of the 1980's, the pressure of the budget deficits played the role of restraining the increase in military expenditure to some degree, and a voice was raised demanding "peace dividends" amid progress in international disarmament such as an abolition of intermediate-range nuclear arms. However, these moves did not link to a sharp reduction in military spending.

In his State of the Union message this time, President Bush cited the following measures, saying they will "represent a dramatic change in strategic nuclear war forces": 1) B-2 bomber production will be capped once 20 planes, whose components were delivered already, are built; 2) the small intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program will be halted; 3) production of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads will be ceased; 4) there will be no new (MX) Peacekeeper missile production; and 5) procurement of new-type cruise missiles will be halted. Militarily, these can be called really epochal in substance. This is because the B-2 is the newest powerful U.S. stealth plane (aircraft which can hardly be detected by the other side's air defense radar) and its mass production just started; the SLBM represents a sector of strategic weapons in which the United States has an overwhelming advantage; and the Peacekeeper is the newest missile, carrying as many as 10 warheads. Therefore, it is impossible to make such decisions unless the United States aims at disarmament in earnest. In addition, President Bush also stated in his message that, if the CIS abolishes land-based multiple-warhead missiles totally, the United States will also abolish its Peacekeeper missiles completely, reduce to one the number of warheads carried by the Minuteman missile, and shift a considerable number of strategic bombers from strategic to ordinary missions.

In fiscal 1991, the U.S. defense budget decreased by 0.1 percent from the preceding year, and its 1992 defense budget was also slashed only by 1.2 percent, compared with the preceding year. However, in the policy set forth this time, the United States is to cut defense spending by $50 billion in five years through a series of these measures. By 1997, it will have thus cut defense expenditures by 30 percent compared with the beginning of President Bush's administration. The fiscal 1993 defense budget proposed to Congress on 29 January amounts to $267.6 billion, $10.7 billion less than the preceding year. The proposed budget disclosed that defense spending will be reduced by a total of $50.4 billion by fiscal 1997. New measures are incorporated in the proposed defense budget such as a halt to the production of the Seawolf attack submarines and reconsideration of a program to develop the Comanche light helicopter.

On 29 January, the day of the Bush speech, Russian President Yeltsin announced a large-scale disarmament plan. Mr. Yeltsin's speech covered 10 items such as strategic arms, tactical nuclear weapons, missile interception and space, nuclear tests and nuclear arms materials, nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vehicles, conventional war power, chemical weapons, biological weapons, the defense budget, and conversion to the civilian industry. Deserving our attention in his speech were a 20-percent reduction in defense spending and a 30-percent decrease in arms purchases in the fiscal 1991 as well as the plans to further reduce defense spending by 10 percent and to decrease arms purchases roughly by half in fiscal 1992. Because President Yeltsin made the speech as a disarmament proposal, the speech contained an important substance regarding the abolition of existing weapons as well; for instance, he proposed an abolition of 130 ICBM underground launching silos. More important, however, he indicated a position not to procure dangerous and expensive equipment for the future by presenting plans to halt research and development of strategic weapons, stop producing strategic bombers (the Tu-160 and the Tu-95MS), and cease the production of air-launched long-range cruise missiles.

People are apt to have a misunderstanding about military technology by considering it to be an extremely advanced technology and have large effects on related areas. However, technological development in the military field regards the enhancement of efficiency as its supreme goal, thereby resulting in weak cost consciousness and ignorance of productivity. On the other hand, civilian industries give priority to the kind of technological development that is achieved through competition in cost and productivity. The two sides have totally different senses of value from first to last, and it is rare of late that the achievements in military technology are converted into civilian industries. Conversely, we see a sharp increase in the number of cases in which the military adopts the brilliant technological achievements in civilian industries. On this score, attention is being paid to technology that can be applied to both military and civilian requirements (that is, dual-use technology—abbreviated as DUT), and Japan's superior civilian industrial technology is being taken up as a theme for the DUT study in the joint development of military technology between Japan and the United States. In concrete, this technology includes techniques related to the arc jet engine (a rocket engine which heats propulsion fuel gas with the electric arc) used for the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), the Josephson-junction microprocessor (a computing processor unit), and the manufacturing of the synthetic diamond.

However, it should not be forgotten that the munitions industry is basically inefficient and ignorant of the ordinary ways of the world and represents a waste of various resources. Even IBM, which was called the "computer giant," is said to be in a business slump lately. The reason is that while it has been selling large planes to the Department of Defense and NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) and indulging in a sweet sleep, small aircraft and personal computers have been developed, and it has delayed in its response to such changes. In an economic sense, an inclination toward the munitions business represents an act of suicide for a manufacturer.

It is gratifying that the United States and Russia, which inherits a considerable part of the former Soviet Union, have set forth large-scale disarmament plans together. Both the United States and the former Soviet Union gave an example of economic exhaustion caused by pressures on the civilian industrial sector as a result of exorbitant military outlays and excessive dependence on the munitions industry. The full-scale disarmament resulting from the end of the cold war will have favorable effects on both the U.S. and Russian economies.

2. World Situation Warrants No Optimism

While the United States and the former Soviet Union have embarked on full- scale disarmament, what will be the situation of the other countries? Their actual conditions are in no way likely to warrant any unqualified optimism.

Under such circumstances, Germany, which has accomplished its East-West unification, is now making clear its disarmament position quite actively. According to its disarmament plan (decided at a cabinet meeting in February 1992), Germany is scheduled to reduce its national Armed Forces from the present strength of 490,000 personnel to 370,000 by the end of 1994, with the Army's 12 divisions curtailed to eight, 48 brigades to 28, and the Navy's 180 transport units to 90. It also plans to simplify the organization of its Defense Ministry and reduce the ministry's personnel sharply (a reduction of 46,000), and defense spending will be cut by 44 billion deutsche marks (about 3.5 trillion yen) in a 12-year period ending in 2004. This measure is said to result in a 35-percent saving in defense expenses that the country formerly estimated for the same period.

However, France has kept showing the position of maintaining its own independent nuclear strategy even after the speeches by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, and the country appears negative about its own nuclear disarmament. Britain's position is close to that of the United States, but it has not necessarily spelled out its clear position yet. China's position is also unclear.

In the meantime, some point out that the danger of nuclear proliferation is on the increase against our expectations. Among some nations facing international strains, not a few countries are strongly interested in and deeply attached to the development of nuclear weapons. At present, in addition to five countries which were listed as nuclear powers in the past, there are those whose development of nuclear arms is imminent, those that have succeeded in the development of nuclear arms, and those that are regarded as possessing a few nuclear weapons. The danger of nuclear technicians and nuclear development-related materials flowing into these countries is said to be mounting. In the former Soviet Union as well, if the CIS's work for a unified Armed Forces does not go smoothly, a situation is unavoidable in which former Soviet nuclear weapons will be dispersed not only to Russia but also to Ukraine. The situation on the Korean peninsula also weighs on our minds. Influenced by the end of the cold war, the dialogue between the North and the South is progressing. It appears certain that many nuclear weapons brought into the ROK have been withdrawn by the United States to somewhere. It is believed that in North Korea two atomic reactors are now at work, and another may become operational this year. It is speculated that reprocessing facilities are also at the same stage. Concerning the nuclear suspicion against North Korea, an advance will be made toward solution when the country accepts the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] nuclear inspection in a practical manner. There are several more countries which cause the fear of nuclear proliferation.

Although there is such a danger, we are moving toward the reduction of nuclear weapons on the whole. At such a time, however, disarmament in the field of conventional arms is not necessarily progressing in a favorable way. Last year, Japan and the EC proposed that a system be set up to report transfers of conventional arms. However, there are tenacious demands for conventional arms in the areas of chronic disputes. Russia, which disclaimed its position as a nuclear power, is moving toward the reduction of conventional forces on its own territory, yet it is as eager to export conventional arms as ever. The arms being exported seem to include used weapons held by its present forces; however, the principal object of the export appears to be to keep operating its munitions factories, whose scale has reached colossal proportions. Russia's policy of preserving munitions factories, one of the prime causes for its economic breakdown, is doubtful in many respects for both the peace of the world and the future of the Russian economy. France is also eager to export weapons.

Where there are unceasing disputes, there are incessant arms dealings. The establishment of a peaceful world free of disputes is fundamental to resolving issues.

3. Japan's Rigid Defense Spending

In the government budget for next fiscal year, defense-related expenditures are to increase at a rate of 3.8 percent from the preceding year, the lowest rate of increase in the last several years. Amid cuts in many outlays under the name of fiscal reconstruction, only increases in defense spending and ODA (official development assistance) were conspicuous in the past. In view of this past pattern, the general public believes that there is a great change in the compilation policy for next year's budget. Nevertheless, it is not proper to call the fall in the rate of increase "a big slash." A fall in the rate of increase does not mean a reduction. It simply means that the pace of increase has slowed down, and there is no change in the fact that defense spending is on the increase. Therefore, it is hard to say that the defense budget reflects the world's political situation with real correctness. Now is the time to orient the budget toward a more active reduction in defense spending.

At this point, let us take a brief look at the substance of Japan's defense spending. Defense spending breaks down into the following two major categories: 1) personnel and food expenditures, and 2) nonpersonnel expenditures. Nonpersonnel expenditures are subdivided into 1) expenses for the purchase of equipment and others, 2) outlays for research and development, 3) facility upkeep

costs, 4) barracks and clothing expenses, 5) outlays for training activities, 6) disbursements for base countermeasures, and 7) other items. The item of "personnel and food expenditures" holds the weightiest position on the list of expenditures, and most of the expenses in this item are salaries for Defense Agency personnel and members of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). This item increases without fail when pay levels for Defense Agency personnel and SDF members—both public officials—rise, affected by the increase in the wage standards in the private sector. Money required for procuring equipment and weapons is appropriated from the item of expenses for the purchase of equipment and others. Outlays for research and development are directly connected with equipment, and so they may be regarded as expenses for equipment in a broad sense. In this regard, outlays for research and development in our country are at low levels in terms of both absolute amounts and relative proportions.

In order to reduce defense spending, the most effective way is to curtail equipment-related expenses. However, we see a very rigid practice in the actual handling of equipment-related expenditure. The reason is that purchases of frontline equipment were made on credit in the past. This is virtually an act of executing future budgets in advance. When frontline equipment is acquired, only a very small part of expenses are paid, and disbursements for the remainder are mostly made later. Such credit accounts are called future fiscal-year liabilities, and their amounts far exceed each year's frontline equipment cost. Accordingly, most of the Defense Agency's annual defrayment related to the frontline equipment is its payment for a portion of the past credit "budgeted" in respective fiscal years. Therefore, even if the government cuts down the purchase of frontline equipment hereafter, it will still have to bother its head over these piles of "budgeted" equipment expenditure at least for four years to come.

Unless we think of reducing these piles of credit, it is impossible to cut defense spending effectively. Therefore, it is important to stop placing new orders and expanding credit. In their arms reduction plans, the United States and Russia are undoubtedly curtailing their equipment procurement packages: For example, the United States has decided to stop purchasing the B-2 at 20 planes and cease producing nuclear warheads for SLBM use, while Russia has decided to halt the production of heavy bombers and cruise missiles.

Likewise, Japan also can stop placing new orders for specific frontline equipment, thereby effecting a great momentum which can link to a sustained future reduction of defense expenditure not limited to a single year. There are many possible ways in this regard such as holding up a plan to purchase the airborne warning and control system plane, the AWACS, of the latest model (a plane costs as much as 35-40 billion yen) and halting additional procurement of Aegis ships (a ship costs about 130 billion yen) whose introduction has already begun. These must be ideas which are conceivable quite naturally, but there seem to be considerable impediments to their actual implementation. The first hindrance is the fact that the government has not yet launched into disarmament. On this point, I would like to renew the discussion in the latter part of this article. The second is the increasing number of products and systems which Japan needs to purchase from the United States because of the rapid approach of our frontline equipment to the advanced areas of U.S. equipment. In case of the AWACS, Japan will have to buy the entire system from the United States, and, as to the Aegis ship, its particular Aegis system is to be purchased from the United States. This FMS (foreign military sales—a formula so named to designate the government's purchases of military equipment from the U.S. Government) formula has again become increasingly important of late. Some fear that a halt to placing orders for such equipment will lead to a reduction in barely achieved demands in the United States for items to be supplied to Japan, resulting in stepped-up Japan-U.S. frictions. However, the claim that the frictions will be eased to some degree by purchasing military products from the United States represents a strange view from the perspective of Japan-U.S. economic relations. There should be many other methods to ease frictions.

Outlays for research and development are small in Japan's defense budget, and so there is little room for a large cost cut under this item. Nevertheless, when we think of the close relevance between this item and our future procurement of equipment, we will realize that it is no futile act to plunge a scalpel into these outlays as well.

For a fundamental reduction in defense spending, it is of course necessary to change the buildup goals described in the "National Defense Program Outline" and in its "Annexed Lists." The substance of the change will, of course, be the reduction of the SDF personnel and equipment. However, if credit piles up while the process of "reassessment" goes on, it will consequently defer an effective cut in defense spending.

4. Reassess National Defense Program Outline Early and Follow Disarmament Line

As already pointed out, Germany's Kohl regime made an extensive reassessment of its security policy and clarified its disarmament direction in February this year. In Japan as well, though belatedly, Prime Minister Miyazawa disclosed the way defense power would be restudied. He disclosed this in his statements made in answer to representative queries at a House of Representatives plenary session on 28 January this year. It is regrettable that the disclosure was not made through his administrative policy speech, but instead in the form of the prime minister's answer to representative questions, thereby indicating his passive position in this regard.

In his representative questioning at the House of Representatives plenary session, Komeito Chairman Ishida asked if it was not anachronistic to have increased defense expenditures by 3.8 percent. Requesting a reassessment of the Mid-Term Defense Buildup Plan and a precise reduction in defense spending, the chairman claimed that now was the time to fundamentally reassess the National Defense Program Outline as well. Social Democratic Party of Japan [SDPJ] Chairman Tanabe also argued that the first step toward disarmament was to reduce the rate of

increase in defense expenditure to zero or to cut expenditures and that the reassessment of the program outline [National Defense Program Outline] should be made in the form of annual programming so that sharp reductions in frontline equipment were clearly visible.

In response, Prime Minister Miyazawa, touching on the mid-term defense plan (Mid-Term Defense Buildup Plan), stated that "the international situation made a sudden change after the plan's formulation, and so we have begun studying reductions ahead of the scheduled reassessment of the plan, which, according to the plan, is to be carried out three years after the plan's formulation (that is, in fiscal 1994)." The current mid-term defense plan covers a period of five years from 1991 to 1995 and is to be reassessed after a lapse of three years in accordance with an institutionalized ruling. In his reply, Mr. Miyazawa also said that, because the reassessment work was being expedited, its result might be reflected in the fiscal 1993 budget. This reply clearly indicates a situation facing the government leadership and Defense Agency and SDF organizations which find it hard to cope with the sudden change in international developments. As to the National Defense Program Outline, the prime minister said: "Moreover, a working-level study of the program outline has begun within the Defense Agency in the belief that it is necessary to examine the way defense power itself should be, apart from such a revision of the mid-term defense plan. This study will require some time because it may be linked to the Annexed Lists of the National Defense Program Outline, depending on the outcome of the study."

It is strictly a matter of course for Prime Minister Miyazawa to have said with regard to the mid-term defense plan that "we have begun studying reductions in advance" and with regard to the National Defense Program Outline that "it may be linked to the Annexed Lists." However, such matters of course have not thus far been mentioned by top government leaders, and in this context it may be said that these remarks represent a position marking a certain advance toward disarmament. Concerning the reassessment of the Annexed Lists, there is a piece of information saying that a plan is now being studied to reduce by about 30,000 the fixed number of ground self-defense officials currently set at 180,000. Nevertheless, we are not allowed to become optimistic by overestimating the prime minister's reply.

The remark that the result of the mid-term defense plan reassessment "might be reflected in the fiscal 1993 budget" means that it will not be reflected in the fiscal 1992 budget, and we thus cannot but feel the government's sluggish reaction. However, a newspaper carries a noteworthy report on the reaction within the Defense Agency to the Miyazawa reply. The 29 January issue of YOMIURI SHIMBUN reported that as to the reply there was an opposing view within the Defense Agency that "it was unwise to have given the impression that the reassessment of the mid-term defense plan would be carried out in fiscal 1993 ahead of schedule." Although it started review of the mid-term defense plan earlier, the Defense Agency is said to be unwilling to implement budget reductions through reassessment of the mid-term defense plan before the fiscal 1994 budget. Moreover, in connection with the portion of the 28 January Miyazawa reply which touched on reassessing the Annexed Lists of the National Defense Program Outline, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato explained on the same day that "the portion is the outcome of the recent elaboration within the government and represents the first answer ever made on this issue." He also said: "Within the Defense Agency, a forum is now studying how to characterize talks on the way the (SDF) personnel policy should be during the mid-term defense plan period, although the policy will not change the fundamental position of the National Defense Program Outline." His remark touched on an important point which is linked with a reduction in the fixed number of the SDF personnel. Such a policy should naturally be worked out on the initiative of the cabinet, and an active disarmament policy should be presented under the responsibility of the prime minister.

The National Defense Program Outline was decided at a cabinet meeting in 1976. In its portion describing the international situation, there is the following passage, which imparts a historic flavor to the document: "In the relations between the East and the West centering on the United States and the Soviet Union, there are various deep-rooted confrontation factors, and..." Plans on defense were established on the basis of Japan-U.S. security arrangements with such an outlook on the international situation. Therefore, nowadays when the international situation has undergone a sudden change, it is evident that they should be reassessed fundamentally.

It is never for the sake of the Defense Agency and the SDF that we have plans on defense. Their fundamental reassessment is what the prime minister, the supreme leader of the government, should handle on his own initiative, and the Defense Agency should lend full cooperation to it. It must be said to represent a really strange attitude to try to defer reassessment and review of the mid-term defense plan as long as possible, neglect fundamental reassessment of the National Defense Program Outline, and keep maintaining defense-related expenses at high levels as before. It is necessary to reduce the fixed number of self-defense officials, reorganize military units, stop procuring unneeded ones among the front-line equipment and outfit, and spell out the way defense plans and the SDF corresponding to the new international situation should be. Of course, these defense plans and the SDF should be regenerated and are not in the garb of the cold war era, but in the attire of the disarmament age.

* Prospects for Defense Industry in New Era

922B0153A Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 7, 14, 21 Apr, 5, 12, 19 May 92—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[7 Apr 92 p 14]

[Text] **Part 1. Crisis Strikes Because of Cut in Defense Spending**

The munitions industry stands at a major crossroad as worldwide arms reductions and reductions in military

spending progress amidst the collapse of the East-West cold war structure. What sort of strategic conversion will our country's defense industry execute to preserve its industrial infrastructure in response to these worldwide trends? This series of articles will pursue the issues and the outlook for the industry.

On 25 November last year, Chairman Kosaku Inaba of the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies (SJAC) and president of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Company, Ltd., delivered a "petition" to Director General Sohei Miyashita of the Defense Agency, who had just assumed duties of that position. The purpose was to appeal the difficult situation facing our country's aerospace industry, especially the aircraft industry, before compilation of the fiscal year 1992 budget.

Our country's aircraft industry budget inclusive of the aerospace industry had just barely reached the level of 1 trillion yen. Moreover, 80 percent of aircraft production work is dependent on equipment supplied to the Defense Agency.

The "petition" was instigated by the sentiment among industry sources that, "if current trends are allowed to prevail, we will not be able to sustain the industry infrastructure," amidst emerging demands for cuts in defense spending from the general public because of declining tax revenues occasioned by the bursting economic bubble.

A strong feeling exists in aircraft industry circles according to industry sources that "profitable levels cannot be reached, unless the Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program (fiscal years 1991-1995) is fully implemented," but such an appeal was never made in the past.

The reason for the absence of any appeal in the past was, according to SJAC sources, that "Japan's defense industry did not wish to appear as if it was working against reports of worldwide moves toward disarmament," but Chairman Inaba's personal appeal can be described as a realistic manifestation of the air of crisis plaguing industry.

In the absence of understanding on the part of the general public, the aircraft industry circle's petition addressed to the Defense Agency cited the fact that the aircraft industry is positioned as a basic industry in advanced industrial nations and stressed that "current conditions in our country reflect the leading role of defense demand" and that "continuation of the industry enhances preservation of the technical and industrial infrastructure."

However, according to sources at SJAC, it is indeed a case where "our industry is very difficult for other industries, not to mention the general public, to understand." Industry sources say that this is the case because the "defense" industry is likened to the "munitions" industry in Europe and the United States and was "treated as a taboo topic after World War II." We can say that industry is undergoing a period of change in connection with defense policy, amidst a major change in the international situation that surrounds Japan.

Demands for reduction of defense spending by our country have increased in the face of the collapse of the former Soviet system and the assumption of a course toward international detente (relaxation of tensions).

The same is true with the Mid-Term Defense Program, but if debate intensifies for a further revision of the already restrained frontline equipment program, the situation will have progressed to the point where, according to Vice President Sadao Takahashi of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., industry circles "must consider some sort of counterplan, as long as we are engaged in business." On the other hand, Director Kazuo Wakasugi of Mitsubishi Electric Corporation expresses the strong sentiment that, "In any event, businesses must make an all-out effort." Defense industry circles are beginning to shudder in a big way as the "crisis" in business operations intensifies with respect to the future of the defense industry.

[14 Apr 92 p 13]

[Text] **Part 2. Mid-Term Defense Buildup—Major Reduction in Procurement of Tanks and Fighter Planes**

The Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program, for which various defense industry-related companies state a desire that "it be fully implemented," covers the five-year period from fiscal year 1991 to 1995 and was prepared in fiscal year 1990.

Reportedly, the special characteristic of this mid-term defense program is that it reflects a major reduction from the major frontline equipment listings for the last Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program covering fiscal years 1986 to 1990 carried in the annex of the "National Defense Program Outline" which prescribed the government's minimum defense capabilities for an independent nation and the specific equipment and personnel needed to attain that goal.

Specifically, the last mid-term program provided new procurement funding for frontline equipment in the amount of 5.53 trillion yen or an overall increase of 7.7 percent, but the current mid-term program provides for 5 trillion yen or an overall reduction of 2.3 percent.

For example, major reductions in procurement quantities are reflected in specific categories; that is, the last mid-term defense program called for 246 tanks, but the current mid-term defense program calls for 132; P-3C antisubmarine patrol planes went from 50 to 8, and F-15 fighter planes went from 63 to 42.

These reductions reflect the fact that the scope of defense capabilities prescribed in the annex to the "National Defense Program Outline" have been attained to a large degree, that emphasis is being placed on the policy to rebuild and modernize the existing front line, and primary emphasis has been shifted to the expansion of logistics support activities such as improvements in living environment for SDF personnel.

According to Vice President Sadao Takahashi of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, the reason why the mid-term defense program is the earnest prayer of the various companies of the defense-related industries is that "the

program represents their production program." The respective companies in Japan's defense industry maintain independent research and development functions for conversion to consumer products, but are completely and structurally organized to produce in "response to orders."

The mid-term defense program serves as the mid-term production program to maintain production lines for special procurement items processed by each company, since the goods manufactured cannot be produced in large volume, unlike automobiles and domestic electrical appliances. According to Mr. Takahashi, If the "National Defense Program Outline" provides a long-term production program, implementation of the mid-term program becomes an indispensable condition in the preservation of the industrial infrastructure "for manufacturers to make efforts towards cost reductions." Needless to say, an end to the East-West cold war period accompanied by the collapse of the Soviet system was not anticipated when the present mid-term defense program was prepared.

If the debate currently calling for revision of Japan's mid-term defense program in light of worldwide arms reduction trends should lead to a debate for a further revision of the outline, which prescribes the minimum defense capabilities as an independent nation, then, according to Vice President Takaaki Yamada of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., "The respective companies of the industry must fundamentally restructure their long-term programs inclusive of production plans."

As stated by Director Takashi Nishioka of the Nagoya Aerospace System Manufacturing Center of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, "The maintenance of a production quota is an absolute condition" required by industries which operate under a system limited to manufacturing in response to orders, but Nishioka also points out that defense-related companies "are about to embark on the improvement of systems in the hereafter" amidst the debate calling for revision of the mid-term defense program.

[21 Apr 92 p 15]

[Text] **Part 3. Licenses Restrict Independent Development—Low-Volume Production Poses Dilemma**

Defense industry circles exercise a strong interest in "licensed production work" in connection with the development and deployment of any given weapon system, in terms of the questions, should priority be given to maintenance and enhancement of technical levels or should priority be given to the maintenance of production quotas?

After World War II, our defense industry, especially the aircraft industry, ceased all development of aircraft, but the Korean conflict provided work in terms of repair of F-86 fighter planes, which later led to restoration of production lines based on the issuance of licenses.

Licensed production provides for the maintenance of production quotas and the concurrent acquisition of technical capabilities, but, upon the completion of that process, can pose "obstacles" to the development of independent technology. Examples of this type of situation have been witnessed frequently in connection with the development of weapons in our country.

Since World War II development of weapons in Japan, inclusive of aircraft, has been dependent basically on the issuance of licenses from U.S. firms, under the framework of the Japan-U.S. security system.

This arrangement remains basically unchanged even now, because, as Director Yoshiki Okamoto of the Toshiba Electronics Systems Operation Department states, weapons systems developed by Japan without the benefit of "actual combat" experience "are overwhelmingly inferior compared to systems developed by the United States based on actual combat experience."

However, Okamoto points out that "there are areas in which Japan leads in terms of basic technology" where rapid progress is being made in the assimilation of electronics into weaponry, such as semiconductor technology which has a high rate of universal application. For this reason, industry has begun to hold high hopes for the independent basic development of weapons.

According to industry sources, during periods of production under license where U.S. firms exercise absolute superiority, U.S. firms extend "black box treatment" to and will not offer essential technology to Japanese firms, but once Japanese firms arrive at a point where they are about to embark on development of the desired technology, there are many cases where the U.S. firm will suddenly open the black box and offer licenses.

Moreover, the same industry source adds, "The path to independent development is essentially closed," because U.S. prices are lower—based on the effects of volume production—than can be attained under independent development by Japan.

Currently, a broad range of principal equipment is being produced under license in our country; i.e., ground equipment such as the 203-millimeter self-propelled howitzer (U.S. BMY—Komatsu, Ltd., and Japan Steel Works, Ltd.); aircraft such as the F-15 (U.S. McDonnell Douglas—Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.), P-3C (U.S. Lockheed—Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.); and missiles such as air-to-air Sparrow (U.S. Raytheon—Mitsubishi Electric Corp. and surface-to-air Patriot (U.S. Raytheon—Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)

Industry has been increasing its developmental capabilities, with special emphasis on electronic technology, based on efforts to gradually enhance its technical strength through production of the above nature.

However, industry is constantly faced with the insecurity and dilemma that any basic technology developed may not be of any practical use because of the unchanging structural situation wherein it must improve its independent technology on the basis of limited production quantities.

[5 May 92 p 8]

[Text] **Part 4. Dreams for Domestic Development of FSX Are Shattered**

A complaint still heard in aerospace industry circles pertaining to the development project for the Japan Defense Agency-Air Self-Defense Force's next-generation fighter plane "FSX" is "When it was determined that the United States would retain 40 percent of the work, industry in our country lost all interest in assuming more than 50 percent of the work."

The FSX is positioned to become the successor aircraft to the F-1, which was developed as a ground-combat-support aircraft from the domestically produced supersonic advanced T-2 training plane. The FSX was scheduled for deployment in 1997 at the end of the service life expectancy of the F-1 and work on the selection process had begun in 1985. According to industry sources, the aircraft industry of our country was initially determined to "provide an all-out effort to aim for domestic production."

However, according to industry sources, "dreams of the aircraft industry" were crumbled with little resistance, when an official decision was made in October 1987 for joint Japan-U.S. development based on the U.S. General Dynamics F-16, as a result of Japan's hesitancy to proceed with domestic development in the face of U.S. reaction to the idea of domestic development by Japan and demands for direct procurement of U.S. aircraft.

Even then, U.S. Congressional reaction was unexpectedly strong, pressure on Japan continued, and, in the final analysis, the joint development program included provisions that: 1) The U.S. share of the work will be 40 percent of the total. 2) Technical developments will be transferred to the United States. 3) flight-control source codes will be given "black box" treatment.

Various domestic companies that had originally targeted their efforts on FSX development to the rapid "exclusive domestic development" of technology, were eventually, needless to say, disappointed by the formation of a project that was subject to the whims and pressures of the U.S. side. Japan's aircraft industry shuns any discussion of the events leading to the FSX as it evolved into a joint Japan-U.S. development project.

According to industry sources, distrust in government leadership abilities simmers "because domestic development of an aircraft that was originally initiated on the basis of clear-cut defense policy was so easily altered on the basis of Japan-U.S. economic friction." Progress in aerospace technology is always referred to as a process of trial and error.

The same industry source explains that "proprietary systems technology can be created only under continuous projects conducted under strong government leadership," as long as no single company has the ability to acquire such capabilities on an independent basis. The FSX, which was supposed to become the vehicle for continued development of engineers as a replacement for the F-1, has met the fate of becoming the target of Japan-U.S. friction.

Development of the FSX has been delayed about two years because the U.S. firm has refused to provide certain technology which must now be developed independently by Japan. And costs are now definitely expected to double and exceed 300 million yen.

The outward appearance of the FSX is expected to be very close to the F-16, because of the decision to abandon the adoption of a "vertical canard" which was to be one of "main features" of new development. Although we are now talking of a different set of conditions, the concept has changed so much from the original plans that it is no wonder that the engineers are asking, "what was the FSX supposed to be?"

With debate calling for revision of the "Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program" being no exception, "arguments asserting the nonessentiality of the FSX" arise whenever the opportunity presents itself. The fact that the aircraft industry cannot help but cling to the FSX project, notwithstanding, is that there are no other projects available that enable the industry to promote its interests in advanced technology. What is most important in connection with the FSX is not defense technology, but the status of future technology.

[12 May 92 p 14]

[Text] **Part 5. OHX—Hopes Pinned on Domestic Development**

After the ASDF's next-generation support fighter plane FSX, currently under development, Japan's aerospace industry has pinned high hopes on and is watching the progress being made on development of the new small OHX observation helicopter, which represents a new design project undertaken by the Technical Research and Development Institute of the Defense Agency from fiscal year 1991. The OHX will be the successor to the OH-6 small observation helicopter now operated mainly by the Ground Self-Defense Force [GSDF] and is to be used primarily for observation and command.

Although small, it will possess a system that integrates ultraviolet sensors, visual color television cameras, and laser range finders enabling significant enhancement of day-and-night reconnaissance and observation capabilities, in addition to unprecedented, increased capacity for coordinated operation with antitank attack helicopters through use of air-to-air missile pods.

As demonstrated during the Gulf war, an indispensable condition for future aircraft is the provision of night-operating capabilities. Great expectations are pinned on the new helicopter, because night combat-operating capabilities of the GSDF are expected to improve significantly with the deployment of the OHX.

On the other hand, the reason why expectations are placed on the OHX to a greater degree by the aircraft industry rather than the GSDF is that it follows in the footsteps of the FSX as a pure domestically developed aircraft. The enthusiasm of concerned companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries is especially strong because the OHX represents the domestic development of helicopters which essentially was never attempted by industry in the past.

Cooperation is strong among companies which normally compete fiercely with each other, because for an industry which lacked any prospect for development of a new aircraft since the FSX, according to Managing Director Setsuo Niki of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, "The OHX is an indispensable project for the maintenance and enhancement of aircraft development technology."

However, despite the high hopes of the GSDF and the strong enthusiasm displayed by various companies, concerned quarters become increasingly reluctant to discuss the development of the OHX. Some concerned quarters don't even hesitate to say that "OHX is an untouchable topic."

Concerned sources say that the main reason why this situation has arisen, despite the fact that the development budget has already been approved, is the persistent fear that "some sort of pressure might be applied by the United States in connection with the development of the OHX." Concerned sources call this the "FSX suspicion."

The reason for this attitude is that Japan's country's industry circles harbor deep-rooted suspicions as a result of pressure from the United States which led to joint development for the FSX which initially started out on the premise of purely domestic production. Obviously, designation of pure domestic production as a premise for OHX development has led to incipient suspicions rooted in those concerning the FSX. The suspicions are aimed at the U.S. munitions industry as well as our country's government.

Such attitudes illustrate the strong interest exercised by Japan's our country's aircraft industry in pure domestic production and can be considered as tying their hopes for their future on OHX development. The term "untouchable" is an honest expression of the industry's mixed emotions of hope and suspicions, while a look from the other side would reveal the degree to which equipment development in Japan is structured in a way that defies logic.

[19 May 92 p 15]

[Text] **Part 6. Research and Development Are Indispensable to the Growth of Technology**

Completion of the current Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program (Mid-Term Defense Program) signals virtual delivery of all frontal equipment programmed as part of basic defense capabilities in Japan's Defense Program Outline.

Although additional cuts are being sought in connection with the review of the outline as currently discussed, as well as the review of the Mid-Term Defense Program, reportedly the effects of such reductions will not become obvious to manufacturers represented by companies in defense-related industries until three or four years later. The sense of crisis harbored by the concerned companies originally applied to the coming three-to-four-year period, and industry circles hinge their hope for retention of technical expertise and preservation of technical standards on "research and development."

Their expectations will increase for expanded research and development, because of the high ripple effects obtainable from research concerning systems pertaining to aircraft and electronic warfare. For example, among aircraft, the FSX next-generation support fighter plane and OHX next-generation small observation helicopter provide industry—which has few other significant aircraft development projects—a never-to-be-seen-again opportunity for cultivating independent technology. Moreover, according to industry sources, "OHX, unlike pure research and development, provides the advantage of a tangible objective and easier measurement of results." Then, individuals like Director Kazuo Wakasugi of Mitsubishi Electric Corp. express the view that one need not even look back at the Gulf war to determine "how essential it is for defense policy to maintain and develop electronic technology." In any event, it is very important for industry to always focus on and adopt the most advanced technological developments.

The defense industry possesses the common perception that it is about to enter a period when it will be very difficult to maintain and manage production lines under a trend calling for cuts in frontline equipment. The reason for this, according to Vice President Sadao Takahashi of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, is that, "from a manufacturing viewpoint, efficiency and improvements depend on continuous work."

However, according to Director Wakasugi of Mitsubishi Electric Co., "Since we must maintain our technical standards," even if we close our eyes to near-future development of weapons amidst the ending of the East-West cold war, strong voices are heard for active future spending in support of R&D.

The Defense Agency's R&D spending for this fiscal year will reach 115 billion yen, over 10 billion yen more than the previous fiscal year. However, this is far below defense R&D spending by Europe and the United States. One of the greatest fears of industry at this time is that this R&D spending may be reduced after cuts in the defense budget for frontline equipment.

A spreading opinion is "reality is that increases in frontline equipment in the post-cold war period lack persuasion. However, enhancement of technical capabilities has a direct bearing on the expansion of qualitative deterrent capabilities."

Now that the defense industry faces definite reductions in workloads because of cuts in frontal equipment, it is faced with the task of producing a new theory which covers expansion of R&D in terms of "qualitative expansion."

* Defense Agency Officials, Policies Examined

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[Article by journalist Tamotsu Saga: "What Is JDA's Mission in Unstable Times?"]

[Text] **Why "Defense Outlay Now?"**

The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are in a state of convulsion. They are trembling with anger. There is only one reason. They are reacting emotionally to the demands by the Diet and a section of the mass media to "reduce defense expenditures because the international situation has changed drastically." They are reacting because the decision that "reductions should be made" came before any deliberation.

An influential leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who was well versed in Nagata-cho politics, i.e., national politics, once made the following comment: "Reasons trail behind like freight cars." That is an apt metaphor denoting Japanese politics. However, there are problems for which reasons (discussions) must come first.

The defense outlay in FY92 budget bill is 4.5518 trillion yen, an increase of 3.8 percent over the previous year. Of this sum, personnel and provisions costs, including payments and food supplies for SDF members, amount to 1.88 trillion yen. In contrast, personnel expenses of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government are approximately 2 trillion yen. SDF allotment is less than the personnel expenses of one local autonomous body. Even when the entire defense outlay is considered, it is far less than the 5.6 trillion yen in combined social expenses for business corporations. Strictly speaking, social expenses are money spent on eating and drinking. In other words, defense expenditures are less than the amount spent on eating and drinking in the Ginza and Akasaka districts.

The defense expenditure problem is seen not only in such comparisons but also, in the allocations.

When JDA leaders and SDF senior officers were interviewed, the following comments were made repeatedly: "The treatment of SDF personnel was not ignored," and "there was the problem of options with a limited 'pie' and the main equipment (tanks, ships, aircraft, etc.) had to be given priority." In other words, they were making excuses for the neglect of personnel.

As everyone is aware, Japan's defense buildup started from scratch after World War II. In June 1950, North Korea crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. Immediately thereafter, United states changed its existing "policy to weaken Japan" and established the National Police Reserve Force (predecessor of the SDF).

Even Japan's minesweeping technique, which was spotlighted during the Persian Gulf mission, started to develop from clearing operations after the Pacific and Korean wars.

"The function was taken over by the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) from the Demobilization Bureau's Navigational Guard Division and actual minesweeping operations and training were conducted openly for years. I participated in minesweeping operations in the Shimonoseki Straits and off the coasts of Wakamatsu and Tobata" (Captain Ochiai, commander of the Persian Gulf detachment).

The removal of mines laid during the Pacific and Korean wars is still being carried out by MSDF minesweepers. Therefore, they have become proficient in coastal minesweeping techniques. The minesweepers are only 500-ton ships because they are for coastal use and MSDF personnel believe that it was an accomplishment for them to navigate to and from the Persian Gulf in ships of that size. Also, on the ground, too, the SDF has the responsibility of bomb disposals centered on Okinawa, the past battleground of fierce fighting.

It might be said that the SDF started with "postwar disposal operations," including bomb disposals which others, such as U.S. Forces, had been carrying out. It was still a reserve force when the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was concluded in April 1952. Without the Security Treaty, Japan wouldn't have been able to stand up to the Soviet threat.

Being in such a state, Japan finally realized that "it must defend its own country" only after the high-growth period had passed. It was after the Cabinet approved the "National Defense Program Outline" (Outline) in October 1976, during the end of the Miki regime. That was only 15 years ago.

Two years later, Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia and at the end of the following year, Soviet Forces invaded Afghanistan. U.S. Forces had completed withdrawal from Vietnam in March 1973 and at the time, United States was suffering from the "aftereffects of Vietnam." The country had lost confidence in its role of "world policeman." In such a situation, the Soviet threat had become a reality. "Each Western nation made efforts of its own to defend its own country. Japan was restricted by the size of the pie (budget) and concentrated on main equipment buildup. Logistics support was not ignored but there was the question of options" (Joint Staff Council [JSC] Chairman Sakuma).

Consequently, the defense level stipulated in the Outline was generally attained during the Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program which started in FY86 (to FY90). Then, it is only reasonable that efforts should be switched to logistics support and personnel treatment "because the gap with the civilian sector had widened too much" (JSC chairman). The excuses offered by senior officials in the aforementioned interviewes reflect an awareness that "logistics buildup had been neglected." Yet, personnel expenditures for the Tokyo Metropolitan Government are still bigger.

The JDA's slogan now is "logistics buildup." The agency is at the stage where the defense level in the Outline has been finally reached and attention can be directed to improvements in personnel treatment. That is the reason why main equipment procurement costs in the budget bill are limited to 31.9 billion yen. Procurement purposes are to "replace outdated equipment." Complaints that "the budget is too severe" (JSC chairman) and "there is nothing else to cut" (Secretariat director general) are probably not bluffs at all. Nonetheless, cries are being made for "reductions, anyway."

The basis of assertions to "reduce defense outlays" in Diet debates and in comments by a section of the mass media is

the dramatic change in the international situation. Discussions are generated by the interpretation that the end of the cold war through collapse of the Soviet Union means peace. The expression, "peace dividends," exemplifies that.

JDA's and SDF's perceptions of this development have the following points in common: "Unstable times have arrived, instead, because of confusion in the former Soviet Union" (Secretariat Director General Murata); "Risks have increased that regional conflicts will occur—Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is a manifestation" (Administrative Vice Minister Hiyoshi); "Conditions in the peripheral regions of Japan have not changed at all" (JSC Chairman Sakuma).

Whether good or bad, the termination of the cold war signified the breakdown of an order. It meant that order could no longer be maintained by only the two powers, United States and Soviet Union. Therefore, "all the countries wanted to take some kind of action collectively." A declaration to "strengthen the United Nations" was made at last year's summit of advanced countries and the top-level UN Security Council meeting was held recently as a demonstration of "collective action."

The presence of order means that a certain level of security is being maintained. Since the old order under U.S.-Soviet leadership collapsed, a new order is being created collectively. The post-cold war situation is one in which one of the "champions," the Soviet Union, is missing. Iraq invaded Kuwait because the Soviet restraint was no longer effective. This is an age of disorder.

The League of Nations, formed after World War I, failed because the United States did not participate and it did not provide for military armament limitations. Ultimately, international order was maintained on the basis of military power. Internal security was also dependent on police power.

Demands are also being made to the JDA to "reassess the Outline." The reason given is that the Outline was drafted during the cold war period.

"It is specified in the mid-term program that it should be reviewed every 3 years so the task is being performed as required" (Secretariat Dir. Gen. Murata). Also, "The minimum defense level was chosen in the Outline, on the assumption of peace, during the period of U.S.-Soviet detente (eased tensions)" (Defense Policy Bureau Director General Hatakeyama). The Outline was based on the assessment that "this is the minimum requirement, even in peacetime, premised on support by U.S. Forces in accordance with the Security Treaty." Thus, the JDA must really want to complain, "what and how should we reevaluate?" Nevertheless, "The LDP has set up a consultation group under the Policy Research Council chairman and the Komeito (Clean Government Party) has submitted the 'Ichikawa (secretary general) private plan' so we shall submit our proposal early" (Secretariat Dir. Gen. Murata). Traditionally, decisions on defense outlays are made after the issues have been debated.

The Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) has been given the alias of "public opinion party." Taken in a good sense, it means the party is responsive to public opinion but in a bad light, it means "indecisiveness." In short, it is an expression meaning the party decides its policies following the drift of some press comments. If it becomes an issue of political ethics, the raison d'etre might be "acknowledged." However, the anger felt inwardly by the JDA and SDF is not difficult to imagine. The reason is that, "To begin with, the second largest political party does not even recognize the existence of the SDF" (Finance Bureau Director General Hoshuyama).

Even with regard to the peacekeeping operations (PKO) issue, the feeling is strong that, "basically, holding discussions on how Japan can cooperate internationally is only proper but the arguments turned to the status of the SDF" (JSC Chairman Sakuma). At the stage when the "unconstitutional" issue has been resolved finally and 80 percent of the people recognize the SDF, publicity rose again that the "SDF was risky."

How the SDF feels can be readily understood.

Setting aside the Japan Communist Party (JCP), it is impossible for the LDP to obtain the cooperation of the SDPJ, which has not yet recognized the SDF. In spite of that, the LDP, which yielded saying, "reasons will follow," must bear much of the blame.

In the postwar period, the SDF was forced to follow the "see-not, hear-not and speak-not" principle. "Defense cuts" were demanded, whenever an occasion arose, because the SDF had been placed in a weak position. SDF personnel had suffered in silence whenever that happened. In what manner will the complaints of uniformed leaders—"how can we maintain the morale of personnel if nothing is done?" (JSC chairman)—be handled politically?

Secretariat Dir. Gen. Murata states: "Public opinion polls show that women have a poor understanding of the SDF. Hereafter, we will try to strengthen our public relations activities vis-a-vis women, including publishers of women's periodicals." Probably, the reason is that women are considered to be more susceptible to SDPJ's propaganda. It can be said to be a new strategy to obtain the people's understanding.

Seeking the people's understanding and support is the issue with which the JDA and SDF are concerned most. Forty years have passed since the establishment of the SDF. Yet, attempts are being made to give a new mission, such as PKO, to the SDF. At this stage, SDF personnel must once again ask and answer for themselves the question of whether the SDF is being truly recognized.

Shima, chief of staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), states: "Even if we are not understood by the people, we must carry on 'in spite of that.' However, there are occasions when the people's understanding is essential. We are in such a predicament."

The Diet debates reflect that situation. The JDA and SDF are caught between the SDPJ, which does not even recognize their existence, and the LDP, which places priority on safe steering through the Diet.

It is said that "Japanese act before they think." They are not satisfied unless they take actions. In the face of politics and mass media which drift with public sentiment, an effective solution is difficult to find. The only hope left is to have as many citizens as possible meditate on the words of JSC Chairman Sakuma: "The fact that SDF personnel can reach the retirement age safely is a blessing for Japan."

Basic Defense Capability Is Needed Especially After the Cold War

Akira Hiyoshi, Administrative Vice Minister

The cold war ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. The international situation is changing drastically while the peace mood prevails. Swayed by that mood, public opinion complicates the situation. Hiyoshi is occupying the vice minister's position when responsive actions are difficult to take. He states: "The end of the cold war should be welcomed. However, the world did not turn into a Utopia where there is no military conflict. Instead, the possibility of regional conflicts occurring has increased. I think that with the cold war on, Iraq's reckless invasion of Kuwait would not have happened. Each country should seriously consider defense of its own country, especially now, following the cold war."

The cold war had its own order. "The Western camp was under U.S. protection while the Eastern side was under Soviet power."

That order broke down. The collapse of an order invites chaos. The risks increased for multiple outbreaks of regional skirmishes. "Putting it conversely, countries which have not been military powers in the past have a greater need to place increased efforts on their own national security. In concrete comparisons of military strengths, the SDF is not equal to the military units of other leading countries."

The United States and the former Soviet Union are reducing nuclear armaments. However, that pertains only to nuclear weapons. The budgets of PRC, ROK, and ASEAN nations are increasing. "We must not yield to shortsighted claims of people, who are emotionally swayed (by the peace mood), that even the capability for self-defense is not needed or that our country's defense power should be curtailed proportionately with U.S. and Soviet nuclear reductions. Our country's defense capability is the basic strength an independent country should possess, at the least, for its own self-defense. My most important task is to strive to make the people understand and to have them make judgments calmly."

Japan's peculiarity is the existence of a first opposition party that does not even recognize the maintenance of defense capability. To seek an understanding from such a political force is a task of considerable difficulty. "The situation has changed considerably from before. Even in opposition parties, forces which recognize the need of defense capability for self-defense are increasing."

One of the changes was the visit to the JDA by the SDPJ. It might've been the "shadow cabinet" doing research. "It was an event that should be greatly welcomed by the JDA and I gained an opportunity to exchange views informally with Yasusuke Uehara, chairman of the party's National Security Committee. We asked them to visit a number of military posts and bases and talk with the troops. Uehara confided that, 'I had thought that many youngsters in the SDF were rigid in their thinking but I was relieved to learn they were very flexible in their thoughts.' I believe that their understanding has deepened."

Seeing is believing. Part of the misunderstanding or lack of understanding is due to the fact that the actual thinking of SDF personnel and the real conditions are not known at all. "Face-to-face talks are needed. That is 'kin-ship.' Understanding will deepen through frequent contacts. We can learn about the thinking of individual party members which we cannot through only the operational policies of the different parties."

The level of defense capability is a factor which is very difficult for the general populace to comprehend. The problem is what is the appropriate level? "We should have the capability to be on constant alert and maintain surveillance continually over our homeland and the peripheral regions even in peacetime. If, unfortunately, we are invaded, we should be able to effectively resist limited and small-scale incursions. This level of defense capability is indispensable for an independent country. Also, joint counteraction with U.S. Forces is needed.

"It should be made known that in case of aggression, invaders will be met with considerably strong resistance. Moreover, that if such aggressions should occur, United States is not expected to watch silently. That would serve to deter aggressions."

Is there a possibility that the United States will weaken its presence in Asia? Phase II (3-year period starting next year) of U.S. strategic planning in the Asia-Pacific region will be announced soon but the United States recognizes that unstable elements exist in the Asia- Pacific region. I've heard that basically, the policy is to maintain the present forward-deployment combat power."

A new mission is about to be added to the SDF. That involves the PKO issue. "The basic mission of the SDF is to defend our country. This has not changed. The PKO issue concerns international contribution and it might be premature to make this a part of the basic functions. People's awareness has not reached that level. However, if it is deemed that the SDF has reserve power because this is peacetime, the intent should be utilize that in international contribution from a diplomatic standpoint."

That would lead to raising the morale of the SDF. "Economic functions performed daily by citizens, in general, are practical actions. It is difficult to maintain morale through training only. If favorable reactions can be received from the people through disaster relief and PKO

(actual actions), that would serve to lift morale. Since they are human beings, SDF personnel would feel that they have done something worthwhile if they are recognized. However, this does not mean that the SDF can request, at its own initiative, to be dispatched."

There are views that dispatching the SDF would be risky. "Other ministries and agencies, as well as the SDF, are all state organs. To say that employees of other ministries and agencies can be sent, but not the SDF, is not very logical.

"Withdrawal from the League of Nations following the invasion of Manchuria, before World War II, was an action opposed by the majority of the international society. PKO is a function participated in by many countries under UN guidance. Japan would become a member of that group.

"By refusing to participate, Japan would become an international orphan as in prewar days. If Japan is believed to be a country which only dishes out money but doesn't want to sweat, isn't is possible that the mood to want to help, in case of an emergency, might not arise in the international society?

"Japan did not appear among the names listed in Kuwait's appreciation note—in spite of all the money that was doled out. In the long run, it is a problem that would affect Japan's national security.

"Regarding the minesweeping unit that was dispatched to the Persian Gulf, the other eight nations commented: 'With this action, Japan became a participant. It made the $13 billion meaningful.' Japanese residing in the region are reported to have expressed appreciation that 'they were able to get by without feeling ashamed'."

Although the cold war ended, the importance of intelligence functions has not changed. In fact, the importance will probably become much greater.

Regarding this point, "Planning has already started. An intelligence unit, composed of concerned departments from the five organizations of JDA internal bureaus (civilian), JSC, GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, will be formed and we plan to get it started before the move of the JDA to Ichigaya. An 'intelligent' building, with full use of high technology, will be constructed at the new Ichigaya site. Through these measures, both the hardware and software facets of intelligence functions will be strengthened."

Hiyoshi was born on 1 July 1933; graduated from the Tokyo University (Law Department); entered the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in April 1959; transferred from the position of MOF Secretariat councillor to JDA Secretariat councillor; after serving as the director general of JDA's Finance Bureau, Defense Policy Bureau and Secretariat, assumed his present position in October 1991. As a hobby, he enjoys fine arts. Since the vice minister's office looked dreary, he brought in a painting from his home. "At first, it was the painting of the Buddha but I was chided that 'the image of Buddha is not fitting in the JDA which has to defend the country,' so I replaced it with the painting of 'Deva' guardian gods."

He has a wife and two sons.

Tells Public Information Section Chief To Target "Women's Groups"

Naoaki Murata, Director General, Secretariat of Director General of Defense Agency

Last year, when the defense outlay was reduced in order to raise $9 billion as contribution to the Persian Gulf, he was serving as the Finance Bureau director general. This year, there are cries for reduction because of the peace mood.

"It is important to keep an eye on the international situation. Yet, (he claims), 'I will do nothing even if the situation is changing.' I want to react only after determining where the situation leads to. Our neighboring countries possess abundant military potentials but we have only attained, at last, the basic level."

Well, the mood is ripe for reductions.

"Defense outlays cannot be altered suddenly. If it's the economy, it is possible to consider actions, such as public work projects when business activities are sluggish or to do this because the economy seems to be overheating. Countermeasures can be taken within a short period. In defense, the construction of a ship or an aircraft requires 5 years or, at least, 3 years. A lengthy period is required from the time of decision until completion and still more time is needed to train personnel and commence operations."

The Japanese people think after they have acted.

"Who is controlling the former Soviet Forces? It is reported to be Shaposhnikov but is not clear how one commander is controlling where and with what authority. Accurate details are unknown, especially with regard to the control of strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, this is an unstable period."

Japanese corporations' social expenses amount to 5.6 trillion yen. That is over 1 trillion yen more than defense expenditures. Personnal expenses alone for the Tokyo Metropolitan Government are approximately 2 trillion yen.

"Personnel and provisions expenses in the defense budget amount to 1.88 trillion yen. That is 41.3 percent of the defense budget. The remainder are materiel expenses of which 38.1 percent is for obligational payments of earlier purchases. The remaining 20.6 percent is for general materiel expenses. The bulk of these expenses are in the logistics area, such as facilities costs needed for maintenance of barracks and dormitories, fuel costs needed for education and training, and costs for countermeasures needed in areas adjoining bases. Included are wages and allowances for U.S. base employees (compassionate budget) and the increase is 15.8 billion yen, which is larger than the 9 billion yen increase in the overall general materiel expenses. That means that there is a real decline and absolutely no margin for reductions."

What is the budget for frontal armament?

"Procurement costs in the current fiscal year outlay amount to only 31.9 billion yen. Only one P3C and seven

F-15's will be purchased. Priority will be placed on modernization and replacement of equipment, such as outdated vehicles, radio equipment, etc."

The development of an oceangoing navy by the PRC and nuclear-related facilities in North Korea pose problems and appear to be designs to extend the missile range.

"The United States is concerned with the Okhotsk Sea which is the base of the former Soviet Union's nuclear submarines. They are wondering what might be happening there."

The Japanese people still have a poor understanding of defense.

"They do not understand why peace continued. Half of the Japanese people are women and they have not gained the understanding. They are likely to equate defense with war. The level of understanding will rise if people who do not understand associate with people who do understand.

I'm telling the Public Information Section chief to 'send staff members aggressively to meetings of women's groups.' It is also necessary to call on publishers of women's periodicals. There are females in the National Defense Academy and we must make women understand that defense is a matter of their direct concern."

Murata was born on 12 May 1937 in Tokyo; graduated from the Tokyo University (Economics Department); entered the JDA in April 1962; assumed his present position in October 1991. He says: "My hobby is golf, though I'm not good as everyone knows. Seven years ago, I weighed 78 kg but today, 63 kg. I have my personal opinions about maintaining a slim figure and I can write a book about it. To give a piece of advice, do not eat fatty foods."

Philosophy of the Outline Is Still Valid

Shigeru Hatakeyama, Director General, Bureau of Defense Policy

His bureau is the linchpin in the JDA. The prime objective of the JDA is to defend the country. Since it formulates policies to do that, his bureau is concerned with practically all of the problems, affecting equipment, personnel and finances. He is called upon for the overwhelming majority of Diet interpellations.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the peace mood is predominant in this country. Opposition parties are demanding defense cuts. Reassessment of the Outline, the basis of defense buildups, is becoming the focal issue in the Diet.

"If only the fact that the Outline was prepared during the cold war is considered, 'it is outdated, at present, since the cold war has ended.' However, when the Outline was formulated, it was the age of U.S.-Soviet detente. It was believed then that there would be no large-scale wars or aggressions against Japan for the time being. Under those circumstances, the Outline opted for the minimum level of defense capability buildup. The perception which prevailed then is still applicable today. Of course, the philosophy, at least, is still valid."

The line of thinking might be correct but the problem is the argument about whether the quantity is excessive.

"The problem concerns the appended chart. Items, such as personnel, might be reevaluated in the future. However, if other nations are replacing the old with the new, we want to modernize, too. In this color TV age, no one wants to replace a worn-out black-and-white TV with another black-and-white."

Technological innovations are taking place rapidly. The power of high-tech weapons was displayed vividly in the gulf war. Without daily routine efforts, armament cannot be modernized. That point is not understood.

The gulf war burdened Japan with a formidable task. That is international contribution. Bills for PKO and international emergency relief units must be formulated immediately.

"From the standpoint of the SDF Law, they are miscellaneous regulations.

We are not saying that the SDF must be engaged. When the minesweeping unit was dispatched, I was very worried and had my resignation ready in case an untoward event happened. To be honest, I do not want to see the SDF dispatched to dangerous areas but only the SDF can perform certain tasks. Of course, it would be a different matter if the objectives were to prevent the isolation of Japan and benefit the entire nation. Though different from past missions, international contribution has become an important task."

The Japanese people are easily swayed by moods. The termination of the cold war is equated to peace. The basic defense problems are not understood readily."

"We must not curry favors. Yet, the JDA should not become egoistic. My job is to find the harmonious position. Another important task is to increase, all the more, opportunities to perform actual duties as peacetime conditions continue to prevail. Troop morale does not rise through training only. The minesweeping mission and the Mt. Unzen disaster relief could be performed only by the SDF. Troop morale can be maintained only if the people count on them. Such real missions must be performed."

Hatakeyama was born on 18 March 1937 in Tokyo; graduated from the Tokyo University (Law Department); entered the MOF in April 1961; after serving as the Finance Bureau director general, assumed his present position in November 1990. He entered the MOF at the same time as former JDA Director General Yukihiko Ikeda and regarding his relations with the present director general, Sohei Miyashita, he says: "When the director general was the MOF's budget officer in charge of agriculture and fisheries, I was the chief examiner under him. My

mother told me, 'you take a long time to become successful'." Noboru Hatakeyama, councillor in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), is his elder brother.

His hobby is weekend tennis and he seldom golfs. That is because he "wants to enjoy meals at home, at least, during weekends." His favorite drink is whiskey and since he likes to drink fast, he says he might commit a blunder or two during a year. As for "karaoke" singing, he is a "very good listener."

Peace Is the Ultimate Goal of Highly Trained Military Skills

Kiyohiko Koike, Director General, Bureau of Education and Training

This is the year of the Barcelona Olympics. The SDF Physical Training School, which turned out a medalist in the Tokyo Olympics, is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Education and Training.

"The objectives are the physical training of all personnel and the nurturing of leaders. The development of athletes who can compete in the Olympics will benefit society and above all, enliven the SDF. The physical training school is in high spirits to 'raise the Japanese flag three times in Barcelona'."

The physical training school is the subject of conversation but it is only a part of the SDF. The primary responsibility of the bureau chief is the education and training of all SDF personnel.

"Although the cold war has ended, military conflicts, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, etc., have not ceased and the future of the former Soviet Union is difficult to predict. We should pray for world stability but, at the same time, put our efforts in education and training with the preparedness that, 'wars should not be forgotten in times of peace.' Also, our basic posture is to maintain and develop the existing bright atmosphere for troops."

Deploring the behavioral attitude of present-day youngsters is a general trend but the moral training of SDF members is based on the directive, "The Attitude Required of SDF Personnel," prepared in 1961 listing five requirements: 1) awareness of mission; 2) self-improvement; 3) fulfillment of responsibility; 4) strict observance of discipline; and 5) strengthening of solidarity.

"The ideal image of a SDF member is: a worthy member of society; an outstanding member of the military; and a respectable Japanese subject as well as an international citizen. It is a person who recognizes the constitutional principles of democracy, feedom and peace. Essentially, I think that would be 'a person with kindness, strength and sound judgment'."

"Since this is the age of high-tech weapons, training in technical skills and technologies is indispensable and military leaders of a certain country, who visited Japan recently, were envious of what they had seen. Perhaps, training is helped by the fact that in Japan, persons become familiar with the family computer from childhood. Speaking of familiarization, various types of routine training are essential. Maneuver and training grounds in this country are extremely small.

"To make up for that, we are using simulators and conducting training in the United States with missiles, such as Patriots, and in airdrops from transport aircraft. The heart of education and training is devotion but we are very strict regarding safety. Exercises must be run so that training can be conducted freely while minimizing risks of accidents."

Also, U.S.-Japan joint exercises are important. U.S.-Japanese cooperation on the unit level is quite difficult. There is the speech problem. This is an area we must consider seriously in the future. Also, student exchanges with foreign countries are important. There is an active exchange with Asia, too. Friendship contributes to national security."

Koike was born on 22 February 1937 in Niigata Prefecture; graduated from the Tokyo University (Law Department); entered the JDA in April 1960; after serving as director of the National Defense College, assumed his present position in November 1990. He has been conferred full mastership in the Yagyu-Shinkage school of Japanese fencing and the traditional Chinese martial art of Taijiquan. "Though I am not very good, I teach others in the neighborhood during weekends."

"The doctrine of Clausewitz (founder of modern military science) was, 'the essence of the military is to annihilate the enemy and this essence is subject to revision by other conditions,' but I think that the Oriental way of thinking is exactly the opposite, i.e., 'the essence of the military is peace and the ideal aim is to achieve peace without fighting.' Peace is the ultimate goal of highly trained military skills. Peace ennobles the efforts. The sword should be sharpened but its use should be avoided by all possible means. I think that it is important to engage in studies on the most effective uses of military power."

Stage for Logistics Buildup, Including Personnel Accommodations

Tatsufumi Tsuboi, Director General, Bureau of Personnel

The 1st Personnel Division is responsible for senior SDF officers, including graduates of the National Defense Academy; the 2d Personnel Division for general fixed-term (two to three years) personnel (retirement age system for rank of master sergeant and above); the 3d Personnel Division for civilian officials; and the Welfare Division handles welfare and mutual aid matters.

In defense, both personnel and equipment are equally essential. Japan's defense buildup started from scratch after World War II. Priority had to be given initially to equipment. The level stipulated in the outline was finally reached in the previous mid-term program and the new current mid-term program started in 1991. The next task is the enhancement of personnel treatment. We are catching up.

The stage has changed from frontline equipment buildup to logistics support. Lining up tanks is a mere show. Without ammunition, they are unserviceable. We must move from servicing in such areas to problems of personnel who operate such equipment. Improvements of antequated dormitories and increases it. pay and allowances must be made.

"Last fiscal year, benefits were approved for early retirees. This an epoch-marking system."

The retirement ages for SDF personnel are 53 years for enlisted ranks of master sergeant and chief petty officer, and for company grade officers; 54 years for ranks of lieutenant colonel, commander, major, and lieutenant commander; and 55 years for ranks of colonel and captain. In this age of retirement at 60 years, the above is a step to make up for the disadvantage of early retirement.

"Steps to revise the system of special compensations (one of the benefits provided upon the death of an SDF official in the line of duty) were taken in the new fiscal year's budget bill. This will abolish the differentials with local government officials. Benefits will more than double, with the maximum at 50 million yen. Police officers and firemen will not be receiving twice as much as SDF officials."

The Personnel Bureau is seriously concerned about the recruitment of young officials. The number of youngsters is decreasing.

"Since the National Personnel Authority is working on the problems of all government officials, the pay scale is not as bad as reported. Questionnaire surveys conducted at the time of enlistments reveal a tendency to dislike the restrictiveness of military life and the transfer of stations. The needs of youngsters are diversified and it is important to meet them. I firmly believe that our organization is excellent in various ways."

In surveys conducted by the Prime Minister's Office, some claimed that they have no knowledge about the real functions of the SDF.

"There are various tasks in the SDF and each is creditable and rewarding in its own way. The purpose of protecting one's country and people and the act of showing one's respect to the national flag mornings and evenings, embody a nobleness that no other organization can match. I hope everyone realizes that."

After three months of training, young recruits are assigned to different units. Parents attending the ceremony marking completion of training are surprised and pleased with the changes in their youngsters.

"At a graduation ceremony of the National Defense Academy, Shumon Miura, the author, stated: 'Your predecessors would have become great, courageous leaders if emergencies had arisen. With peace continuing, they have only aged. The next generation of personnel is being trained under such circumstances. That is good.' Ochiai, commander of the minesweeping unit that was sent overseas, said, 'Instead of boasting that I succeeded, keeping it to myself is my real pride.' We have trained such personnel in large numbers.

"We must continue striving to maintain high morale in peacetime. For that reason, too, it would be welcome if the skills and capabilities that we have accumulated can be used to serve our people and the international society.

"The SDF is an organization that can respond to such commitments."

Tsuboi was born on 3 January 1939 in Tokyo; graduated from the Tokyo University (Law Department); entered the JDA in April 1962; after serving as Education and Training Bureau director general, assumed his present position in November 1990. His hobby is Japanese checkers. He says he is "an enthusiastic but poor golfer."

Capability To Maintain World Order Weakens

Noboru Hoshuyama, Director General, Bureau of Finance

The Bureau of Finance is equivalent to the Secretariat's accounting division in other ministries and agencies.

"The bureau is responsible for overall coordination of finances, including the preparation, management, and settlement of budgets for not only the three Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, but the Technical Research and Development Institute [TRDI], National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, Central Procurement Office, Defense Facilities Administration Agency, et al., as well as the organization and control of internal audit organs. The Finance Bureau director general represents the JDA at budget-related meetings of Secretariat directors general of ministries and agencies."

The underlying reason why finance is an independent bureau is the difficulty with the defense budget. There are arguments in the Diet that the defense outlay is too large.

"Arms reduction is said to be a world trend, but the defense efforts which have been carried on by various countries cannot be compared with that of postwar Japan. The quantity and quality are different. Japan has exercised extreme self-restraint and controlled military buildup independently. It is a mistake to disregard such a past history and consider Japan in the same category as others. The present level of defense capability is a basic one which an independent country should always maintain."

The problem is that genuine defense discussions are not held in the Diet. There are many unfruitful discussions involving the second-largest party, which does not even recognize the necessity of defense power, as heretofore.

"Operations and capabilities to defend one's country at the risk of lives, in emergency situations, are absolutely necessary for a nation. Of public services, the defense undertaking is the most vital. Persons who voluntarily select such a task, which is hard on individuals, are decreasing. Leaders of countries take pains to maintain and control the morale of military troops. Our country is weak on this

fundamental point. Comments which erode troop morale are made unconcernedly. The task of defending Japan is a very difficult one."

Former Prime Minister Nakasone once stated, in his Diet interpellation, that maintaining national security was the most important public service. Without defense efforts, economic wealth, no matter how great, can disappear in an instant. Kuwait, which was said to be the world's richest country, is a good example.

"If one's own power is inadequate, it should be reinforced through alliance with other powerful countries. It would be too late to do that once a country has been invaded and turned into ruins. Experiments must never be conducted with defense power. By preparing for emergencies through lessons learned from examples of other countries, we can maintain independence, peace, and prosperity. That is defense."

Triggered by the Gulf war, stengthening of the UN was proposed at last year's summit of advanced countries, and the UN Security Council summit meeting was held recently. The world is groping for a new world order and it means conversely that the international situation has become that much more fluid.

"The Soviet Union has disintegrated. United States is reducing nuclear arms. Therefore, some claim that times are peaceful but the opposite is true. The important point is to remember the fact that the capability and police power to maintain world order have weakened."

Disorder in the former Soviet Union and the overseas outflow of its nuclear scientists have given rise to world-wide uncertainty. There are countries scouting these scientists. The end of the cold war is creating new fears of nuclear proliferation, multipolarization, and uncertainty. There is little discussion about them. "I think that we need not only the G-5 or G-7, but a new entity, such as an 'M (military) X,' to maintain peace."

Hoshuyama was born on 7 January 1937 in Oita Prefecture; graduated from Waseda University (Economics Department); entered the JDA in April 1963; after serving as JDA councillor, assumed his present position in October 1991. Among high-ranking bureaucrats, he is different in that he is a private university graduate. "I got my start when I was persuaded by the then defense councillor." During his Waseda days, he was a member of the "Politics and Economics Study Society." His hobby is tennis.

Promote U.S.-Japan Technological Exchange

Osamu Seki, Director General, Bureau of Equipment

When the subject of JDA's equipment is mentioned, everyone thinks of armament. That is the matter of central concern to the Equipment Bureau as to be expected. However, to operate equipment, oil is needed. Clothing and food for SDF personnel are necessities, too. The Equipment Bureau handles all such items.

"Another pillar is technological development. Research and development are indispensable in the present age when the technological level is rising by leaps and bounds. Also, equipment must be standardized, as much as possible, so they can be used interchangeably. Although plain, it is an important task to increase efficiency."

The strength of the Japanese economy lies in technological power and, unlike in the United States, the civilian sector is depended upon to a great extent for basic research. That asset is utilized in many instances for various types of JDA equipment.

"Many U.S. defense industries rely heavily on the Defense Department but the extent of Japanese corporate dependence on defense is about 20 percent, at the most. Strictly civilian enterprises also possess various technologies. Without a grasp of technologies, covering such fields as electronics and new materials, the future course to be set for equipment will be affected."

In deciding on the FSX (next-generation support fighter), the question arose as to whether it should be produced domestically. Eventually, agreement was reached for joint development with the United States. However, it has been pointed out that there is dissatisfaction in the United States about a one-way flow of technology away from the United States.

"During the regime of the Nakasone cabinet, a decision was made on the framework for transfer of technology to the United States. In accordance with the procedures set, Japan has been transferring technology, and both countries plan to strengthen arrangements for technology exchange in the future. There is another aspect. Joint research and development between the United States and Japan has been the recent trend and its importance is increasing."

Since the FSX is the first project, conferences with responsible officials of the U.S. Defense Department and the S&TF (System and Technology Forum) meetings have become much more active.

"It was decided at last September's meeting that, of the five fields which had been investigated and studied, the area of ducted rocket engines will be made a joint research area and, at present, agreement notes are being considered. The remaining sectors are expected to be handled successively in a similar way."

The subject of the five fields was incorporated in the Tokyo Declaration announced during President Bush's visit to Japan. "The two-way relationship in technological exchange was confirmed at the U.S.-Japan summit and that is the present trend." U.S.-Japan technological exchange is a task for the entire economic community and "the JDA is shouldering a part of that."

U.S.-Japanese relations appear somehow to be strained with entanglements, such as the trade imbalance.

"In such a situation, it is important to increase the areas in which the United States and Japan can cooperate. This might sound repetitious, but I want to put further efforts in U.S.-Japanese exchange, including research and development aimed at technological innovations."

Seki was born on 23 August 1939 in Hokkaido; graduated from Tokyo University (Law Department); entered MITI in April 1962; after serving as the Secretariat's general affairs councillor, assumed his present position in June 1990.

In karaoke singing, he likes popular songs, such as *Michizure* [*Traveling Companion*] and *omae ni* [*To You*]. He also likes to probe into local history and, recently, he toured the sites of the first British legation in Japan and the shell mound in Minato Ward, Tokyo. He spends most weekends with his family and his motto is "don't talk about work at home."

Defense Is Irreparable

Makoto Sakuma, Chairman, Joint Staff Council

In each of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, there is a staff office and a chief of staff. The JSC considers, evaluates, and coordinates the activities of the SDF from the standpoint of maintaining unity. Sakuma is a graduate of the National Defense Academy and this is his first chairmanship.

It was noticed in the Gulf war that at press interviews of the U.S. defense secretary, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Powell, was always beside him. Security Council meetings are held in Japan, too, but it seems that the JSC chairman is seldom called to the Prime Minister's Official Residence.

"According to the law establishing the Security Council of Japan, 'the chairman (prime minister) can request the attendance of the JSC chairman and others concerned and ask for their opinions, when necessary.' Legally, official members are ministers and agency heads. The prime minister is not required to invite the JSC chairman if he does not consider it necessary. In the past, the chairman was not called to every meeting, but, for the past several years, he has been attending regularly. The U.S. JCS chairman, too, is not given the same treatment as the defense secretary. Basically, I think it is a matter of application rather than the rule itself."

When the minesweeping unit was dispatched to the Persian Gulf, Sakuma was the MSDF chief of staff. When the unit returned after achieving unexpectedly successful results, he had become the JSC chairman. The overseas dispatch of the SDF is now being debated. This is a new task that was never assigned before.

"The traditional duty of defending one's country must not be changed. If the government is going to assign, in addition, the new mission of international cooperation, it is necessary to build a setup that can respond to that in an orderly way."

What are your thoughts on the substance of the arguments?

"First of all, the arguments on the role of the SDF are misplaced. The nation's course on how Japan should exist in the international society must be clarified first. Obtaining unanimous agreement of the people might not be possible, but, after solidifying the consensus of the opinion, the government should consider what type of task can be undertaken through what means. The use of the SDF should be decided as the sequel to that. To start the discussion with arguments on whether the SDF should be sent is putting the cart before the horse."

Why did that happen?

"I feel that it was done deliberately out of political considerations.

There is still a political party that does not recognize the existence of the SDF and, from the standpoint of such a political force, it would be inconsistent to use an organization which is not even recognized."

The dispatch of the SDF is considered risky.

"Everyone feels the same about desiring peace. SDF officials are fully aware of the tragedies of modern wars. They want to avoid wars the most. However, there are assertions that the dispatch of the SDF will lead to war and there are emotional appeals that their own children should not be sent to battlegrounds. The arguments are not logical or meaningful."

There are misunderstandings and prejudices surrounding the SDF.

"Eighty percent of the people claim that the SDF is necessary, but because they do not know the actual status of the SDF, they are easily swayed by moods. It is difficult to have realistic and concrete discussions. It is important for the SDF to occupy an appropriate status and position, that is neither inflated nor deflated, in Japanese society."

Isn't there another factor, commonly called the "peace obsession?"

"It is an indisputable fact that militarily, postwar peace is due to the existence of the SDF and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. That is the point I would like to see attention focused on in the current arguments about defense capability. When peace continues for a long period, the reason why that state existed is completely forgotten. The actual structure and functions, which have maintained peace and security, should be analyzed objectively, and policies for the years ahead, based on lessons learned from the past history, should be formulated on how to deal with future international situations. That aspect is not being discussed at all."

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, various arguments abound.

"In the international situation, what happens on the surface is the most understandable. However, there are underlying conditions that should be considered. Of the two forces which confronted each other in Europe, if the threat of one force should disappear for the time being, it is only reasonable to make proportionate reductions. We talk about the international situation, but regional differences do exist and to take up a single event and make a snap judgment that the entire world has changed accordingly would be a mistake. The peripheral regions of Japan have not changed at all."

Conversely, the peace mood is all-pervasive in this country.

"If Utopia is coming, both the United States and the former Soviet states would abolish all nuclear weapons. However, that is not happening because the past concept of power balance is still alive on both sides. National security measures are preparations for the worst situations. It is predetermined that drastic actions, which risk danger, must never be taken. Therefore, it is necessary to watch the opponent's move very carefully and it is premature to think that peace has arrived suddenly. In environmental protection or business operations, the practice is to take the initiative and make the first move but in defense if, by chance, a mistake is made, it is irreparable. A posture of extreme caution is essential."

What are your views on the talks about budget reductions?

"I was instructed by a certain predecessor that: 'If no crisis is anticipated over the next 10 years, invest in R&D. If a crisis is expected within five to 10 years, put your efforts on frontline equipment. If expected sooner, place your emphasis on ammunition, etc.' There were international crises after the invasion of Afghanistan and various Western countries exerted efforts on their own defenses. Restricted by budget size, Japan put its efforts on frontline equipment. That choice was not mistaken but, as a result, the gap with logistics widened too much. Emphasis is now being placed on logistics buildup."

Such developments are not understood.

"Actually, the fact that SDF personnel can reach retirement age during peacetime is a blessing for Japan, too. When we joined the SDF, we never thought we could attain retirement age without encountering, even once, an emergency situation. I think we were fortunate in that our classmates were able to reach retirement age while we were still at peace."

What about the morale of the troops?

"If the minesweeping crew is told, 'you are being dispatched for a certain period,' members will have a feeling of satisfaction upon completion of the mission. However, if they are told, 'peace has been maintained since the end of World War II because you have accomplished your mission—you must continue to do so,' they will not be impressed because the actions are not specific. That is the difficult part. Morale has been sustained so far. The question is whether a sound posture can be maintained hereafter without doing anything. Considerable efforts will be required in a society where there is a political force which still does not recognize the existence of the SDF.

The government must make efforts and the people should also be concerned with the problem."

Sakuma was born on 18 March 1935 in Hyogo Prefecture, graduated from the National Defense Academy; entered the MSDF in March 1957; after serving as the MSDF chief of staff, assumed his present position in July 1991.

"My responsibility is to upgrade, even if only slightly, the organization that I inherited from my predecessors before passing it on to my successors. I want to serve faithfully. I am telling my successors, 'Do not become a uniformed bureaucrat.' If the manner of thinking becomes that, there will be no justification for being a SDF official. We must not forget our basic values. Few people think about the good of the country in present-day Japan. They might be called eccentric, but only if such persons exist will there be happiness for the people and peace in the country." He is an "avid, random reader." He does not golf.

"Support Troops 100 Years for the Sake of One Day"

Atsushi Shima, Chief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force

The new Tokyo showplace is the underground bunker at the GSDF's Ichigaya post. The concrete bunker is four meters thick and the ventilating fan still works. This used to be the underground headquarters of the former Ministry of War. It was the war room of the war minister and chief of staff. The GSDF chief of staff is holding the same position as the former chief of staff.

"He is the commanding officer of the GSDF which executes the orders of the JDA director general, the staff officer who gives expert advice to the director general, and the commander of the staff office.

At present, the GSDF is finally engaged in modernization, including the replacement of Type-74 with Type-90 tanks. Meanwhile, a large chorus of cries is clamoring for budget cuts. "It is proper to pursue efforts to increase efficiency. However, the international situation is unclear. It is important to maintain a firm posture that is not swayed by circumstances."

Do you mean do not vacillate?

"What I said might be taken to mean that we are viewing the situation uneasily. I meant that we should be calm and collected. There is a military proverb that 'troops are supported for 100 years for the sake of one day.' It is the special characteristic of defense that a lengthy period is required for preparation. Instead of being concerned with things at hand, a long-range outlook is necessary."

The former Soviet Union is still in disarray as before. Its influence on Asia cannot be judged.

"There is a saying that 'we must not forget war in peace.' There was order even during the cold war and there was a peaceful period. Those words were considered important during that period. Now, we are closer to 'war.' During these times, 'supporting troops for 100 years,' becomes vital."

That reasoning is correct, but the people are being carried away by the peace mood.

"It might not be possible to make the people understand. However, the SDF must have the resoluteness to say 'in spite of that.' Even if unappreciated, tasks which require much time, such as equipment modernization and training, must be carried out. We are caught between that necessity and the realization that, after all, we need the understanding of the people."

For such activities as PKO, the people's understanding is really necessary and at the same time, the understanding of the troops is also needed.

"We, ourselves, never thought about duties outside of maintaining our country's order and security. We conducted training on how to repel the enemy if invaded. When it comes to PKO, nonuse of military force becomes a precondition. Reorientation of our thinking and training will become necessary."

In internationalizing the SDF, another important activity is disaster relief operations. The GSDF will also play the leading role in this.

"In disaster relief missions, the GSDF has achieved successful results for the past 40 years within this country and special training will not be required to undertake counteractions. The problem is equipment. At Mt. Unzen, tanks were brought in to observe the volcanic activities at night. However, tanks cannot be taken to foreign countries. The problem will be the handling of such equipment."

Regardidng the problem of personnel recruitment, he stated: "It is necessary to reform the system so that those who were not formerly in the SDF can become reserve SDF officials. I also want to expand aggressively the scope of women's functions."

Shima was born on 27 December 1934 in Nagasaki Prefecture, graduated from the National Defense Academy, entered the GSDF in March 1957; after serving as the commanding general of the Northern Army, assumed his present position in March 1990.

He golfs once or twice a month. "If you use the small cup when drinking Japanese sake, you cannot keep track of the amount and, at times, drink too much. At a lecture to the Defense Academy cadets, I talked about my blunders and they only remembered that part." He said that with a wry smile.

Minesweeping Mission Was "40th Anniversary Flower"

Fumio Okabe, Chief of Staff, Maritime Self-Defense Force

The MSDF attracted the world's attention last year. That was the dispatch of the minesweeping unit to the Persian Gulf. The SDF, which did not leave the country at all, except for missions such as training, "crossed the ocean" for the first time. That was an epochal event for postwar Japan. Okabe assumed the top MSDF post just when the minesweeping unit reached the Persian Gulf and was about to start minesweeping operations.

"It was an event that will remain in MSDF history and I was deeply moved. It was the result of the efforts and support of many persons. I received many letters of encouragement. I've heard that when the unit arrived there, Japanese residents told the members, 'we are really grateful that you came.' I think the crew did a fine job because they received such comments."

The minesweeping unit departed only two days after the official orders were issued. The maintenance of Japanese security, which is the traditional mission of the SDF, must not be interfered with in any way. There must have been the question of selection as to which units should be dispatched. There might've been the question, too, of how effectively the units, which usually train separately, can coordinate their actions.

"In the case of the MSDF, there are ocean-going voyages as well as the RIMPAC (U.S.-Japan joint maneuvers). Just as the ship Shirase is now in the Antarctic region, simply going to foreign lands is a routine function. However, the recent event was not a maneuver but actual operations. Everything went well because of the daily training. I fully realized again how important training was. To put it another way, it showed the value of the tradition which emphasizes training."

The ocean area for which the SDF was responsible was the innermost section of the Persian Gulf. In late July, British and French fleets withdrew and only the U.S. Navy remained. The ocean area included the section claimed as territorial waters by both Iran and Iraq and the operations were to be carried out jointly by the MSDF and the U.S. Navy.

A total of 34 mines were disposed of. The number is fewer than other countries but "the visibility was poor, the current was swift, and the water was shallow. There was an oil pipeline on the ocean floor." It was said to be the most difficult sector. Collection of accurate and sufficient data was indispensable.

"Information collection went well with the U.S. Forces for various reasons, including the established cooperative setup. The minesweeping operation was evaluated highly and I believe that it was a factor which contributed to friendlier U.S.-Japanese relations."

This is a problem common to the SDF, in general, but the biggest concern is personnel recrutment. In next fiscal year's budget draft, crew allowances have been expanded and construction costs of dormitories for ship crews have been partially included. These are important steps for the SDF, which is looked upon by youngsters as the typical "3K" [kitanai, kiken, kitsui—dirty, dangerous, difficult] job. "Of the 511 members of the recent minesweeping unit, about 100 were 22 or 23 years old. Other youngsters of the same age are enjoying disco. I am receiving reports that such crew members really performed well. I feel that the people support and count on them."

This year is the 40th anniversary of the MSDF.

"The MSDF is an open-minded, liberalized organization. I want to protect and cultivate this tradition before I pass it on to my successor."

Okabe was born on 18 March 1935 in Fukuoka Prefecture; graduated from the National Defense Academy; entered the MSDF in March 1958; after serving as the commandant of the Sasebo District, assumed his present post in July 1991. He likes to golf and shoots around 90. He says he was "relieved" when his only daughter got married last year.

Quantity Cannot Make Up for Quality

Akio Suzuki, Chief of Staff, Air Self-Defense Force

The war seen in the living room. That was the Gulf war of a year ago. There must have been persons who felt, while watching on TV the Baghdad bombing by multinational forces, that modern warfare was air battle using high-tech weapons.

"The battle for air supremacy at the beginning of war holds the key to victory or defeat. This is the age when air power determines overall defense strategy. A power vacuum invites aggression. History teaches us that and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (during the pause after the cold war) proves it. Our mission is to secure air supremacy and maintain an air defense capability that will not create a vacuum."

It is now said that an aircraft is a "flying computer."

"The special characteristic of air strength is that quantity cannot make up for quality. Therefore, it can be said that in the technological field, to be sure, as well as in upgrading the proficiency level of personnel and in software applications to operational functions, we have continued our unrelenting pursuit to attain the world's first-class ranking in every aspect."

Patriot missiles fired at oncoming Scud missiles... I can still recall vividly the TV pictures.

"Highly precise missiles were seen in the Gulf war. Electronic jamming warfare was also seen. With what we had seen as a lesson, we shall strive so that we will not become antiquated in the 21st century. This is the area in which we must place our utmost efforts."

To put it another way, an aircraft symbolizes intelligence warfare. "Defense buildup to prevent surprise attacks and equipment modernization must be carried out from day to day." That is to be expected, but the problem is raising the proficiency level of personnel. As the age of civil aviation progresses, the sky over Japan is becoming restricted. The air space for training by SDF pilots is becoming smaller.

"If the training area is not clearly defined, proficiency will not improve. In coordinating with the civilian sector, we are telling the Ministry of Transportation that the sky should not be thought of only in three dimensions but should be considered four-dimensional, adding the time differential. That type of air control is needed."

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the ASDF is the scramble (emergency takeoff). It is a type of policing action to prevent violation of national air space and is a daily routine duty to protect Japan's sovereignty. That is one of the reasons why the ASDF is "continually on tense semi-alert status," but the pilots are constant targets for proselytizing by civilian enterprises.

"Transfers to the civilian sector are fine if they so desire after serving a fixed period (age). Regarding that point, I want to strive to make possible somewhat more suitable adjustments."

Out of consideration for trade frictions, the government purchased an aircraft for its exclusive use. After various arguments, it was decided that the ASDF will be given its control. The ASDF will be responsible for operation beginning in April and SDF personnel will also perform stewardess services. While opinions recommending "female pilots" were being voiced in the outfit, the first SDF female crew members did appear. "ASDF members understand that another rewarding task has been added."

Suzuki was born on 29 August 1933 in Hokkaido; graduated from the National Defense Academy; entered the ASDF in March 1957; after serving as the commanding general of the Air Defense Command, assumed his present post in July 1990.

He likes sports and enjoys tennis during weekends. "I select drinks to suit the food. I can drink all I want on nights before my days off"—so says one who enjoys his weekends. "The chief of staff post is like a relay station. My task now is to properly pass on to my successor the traditions that have been handed down successively."